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THE EARLY DAYS OF THE QUEEN'S RANGERS	
<i>John R. Cuneo</i>	65
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY	
<i>Louis Morton</i>	75
THE ARMY AND THE STRATEGIC BOMBER	
<i>Robert W. Krauskopf</i>	83
RE-ASSESSING A REPUTATION	
<i>Martin Blumenson</i>	95
THE MILITARY LIBRARY	
Reviews of Selected Books and Periodicals	103
HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE	119

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Part I (Index Vol. XXI see Part II)

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# THE EARLY DAYS OF THE QUEEN'S RANGERS AUGUST 1776—FEBRUARY 1777

By JOHN R. CUNEO\*

**R**AISED for service in the American Revolution,<sup>1</sup> the unit known to history as "Queen's Rangers"—but originally called the "Queen's American Rangers"—began its history with an incident in the life of one individual.

Seventeen hundred and seventy-six. A small boat bobbed alongside the H.M.S. *Eagle* as it swung at anchor off Sandy Hook in the warm mid-July sun. A tall, middle-aged man wearily clambered aboard. Word soon spread through the swarm of tall-masted vessels surrounding the *Eagle*: "Major Robert Rogers has escaped from the rebels!"<sup>2</sup>

All knew "Major Rogers of the Rangers."<sup>3</sup> Newspapers had spread his fame on two continents. A brilliant career in the Old French War had been followed by his supposed treason at the far western post of Michilimackinac. He had been acquitted by a court martial but the dark cloud hovered around him as he frantically sought government aid in London, only to spend almost two years in debtors' prison. A famous civil action against General Gage had brought down on Rogers' head the condemnation of the army's high command and King George forbade his being given *any* command.<sup>4</sup> It was widely believed that he returned to America to enlist in the

rebel cause: rumor had made the Major American "Commander in Chief of the Indians."<sup>5</sup>

Actually, Rogers had returned to America with the hope of recouping his personal fortunes, since London's doors had been shut firmly in his face. He had little comprehension of the rebellion under way on these shores, and treated it as a surface manifestation which would probably soon disappear. When he finally realized that he must choose sides, he sought a commission from the Americans. But it was too late. Orders from General Washington caused his arrest while en route to Philadelphia, where he purposed to lay his recommendations before the Continental Congress. Imprisoned on "violent suspicion" (to quote Thomas Jefferson)<sup>6</sup> of being involved in the famous conspiracy against Washington (which existed principally in the inflamed minds of the patriots), he was refused an opportunity to serve with the Continentals or even to return to England via the West Indies. Facing trial, when niceties of proof meant little to revolutionary judges,<sup>7</sup> Rogers had little choice. The result was as his legend would have had it: he escaped from the Philadelphia prison and made his way to the British.

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<sup>1</sup>The Queen's Rangers of the American Revolution had no connection with Robert Rogers' earlier ranging units or with detachments as the "Queen's Rangers" which fought at Detroit in 1763 during Pontiac's siege.

<sup>2</sup>See e.g. entry of 18 July 1776, *Thomas Moffat's Diary*, MS, Library of Congress; Serle to Dartmouth, 25 July 1776, *B. F. Stevens's Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America 1773-1783 with Descriptions, Editorial Notes, Collations, References, and Translations*, Vol. XXIV (London, Nov. 1895), 2040.

<sup>3</sup>A biography of this title is being prepared by the writer for publication.

<sup>4</sup>Memorandum of King George, 1 Apr. 1775, Sir

John Fortescue, ed., *The Correspondence of King George the Third. Vol. III. July 1773—December 1777* (London, 1928), 195-196.

<sup>5</sup>See e.g. letter of 6 July 1776 in Margaret Wheeler Willard, ed., *Letters on the American Revolution 1774-1776* (Boston & N. Y., 1925), 325. Such rumors were printed in the newspapers and were the source of the title on the famous fictitious portrait of Rogers issued by Thomas Hart in London on 1 Oct. 1776 and copied in both France and Germany.

<sup>6</sup>Jefferson to Fleming, 1 July 1776, photograph of MS, M. Lincoln Schuster, ed., *A Treasury of the World's Great Letters* (N. Y., 1940), opp. 170.

<sup>7</sup>For a contemporary admission that there was no proof of any guilt on Rogers' part see Bartlett to Landon, 15 July 1776, Peter Force, ed., *American Archives. Fifth Series. Vol. I* (Wash., 1848), 348.



Here he found welcome—possibly unexpected. With the news (actually false) that the rebels were trying to induce Rogers to join them, the King had changed his mind and General Howe had been given permission to make an offer to Rogers.<sup>8</sup> The latter can scarcely be blamed for some desire for revenge: he was now receptive to the British overtures.<sup>9</sup> On August 6, General Howe reported to Lord Germain: "Major Rogers, having escaped to us from Philadelphia, is empowered to raise a battalion of Rangers, which, I hope, may be useful in the course of the campaign."<sup>10</sup>

Loyalists had been flocking to the British, hoping to help end the uprising in a hurry. Recruiting progressed rapidly. Some of the new soldiers were men of principle, who had refused to abandon their loyalty to Great Britain and were now anticipating the joy of avenging the losses, insults and beatings enduring at the hands of the Sons of Liberty. Others were adventurers, looking toward gain when the obviously stronger side surely would prevail, or mere scoundrels interested in the loot of war. It was a weird combination, with one common denominator: few had any experience as soldiers.

When Rogers surveyed these recruits of '76, farmers and townspeople who scarcely knew one end of a gun from the other, he must have despairingly recalled the experienced and sturdy New Hampshire men of '56 in his first ranger unit. These men, now facing him in ragged line, were not "rangers"

<sup>8</sup>Germaine to Howe, 5 Jan. 1776, Peter Force, ed., *American Archives. Fourth Series. Vol. IV* (Wash., 1843), 575.

<sup>9</sup>Rogers was approached by General Clinton when the latter put into New York harbor on 4 Feb. 1776 while en route to Charleston. Rogers refused on the basis that he had given his parole to the Americans not to bear arms against the colonies. Memorandum by Clinton, *Journal of an Expedition to the Southern Colonies under the Command of Maj'r Gen'l Clinton*, MS, Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library. This contradicts the accepted historical view that Rogers at this time was guilty of duplicity towards the Americans.

<sup>10</sup>Howe to Germain, 6 Aug. 1776, Force, I, 789.

—yet inevitably they carried the once proud title of "Rogers' Rangers."

British officers looked askance at the outfit. During the previous war, the regulars had been forced to accept the rangers because the battlefields were in the forests of northern New York. Here in southern New York the wilderness had disappeared. Conditions were not unlike European battlefields. Townspeople and farmers had no special qualities or training to stand in line with British regulars.

Something else had developed in the British mind: a tendency to "look down" on all Americans.<sup>11</sup> Shortly before he left London in 1755, Franklin told of the reflections cast "on American courage, religion, understanding, etc., in which we were treated with the utmost contempt, as the lowest of mankind, and almost of a different species from the English of Britain. . . ."<sup>12</sup> An English writer in 1776 described American troops as being "effeminate, new raised soldiers, commanded by officers without knowledge or experience."<sup>13</sup>

What particularly rankled the British officers was the fact that the officers of Rogers' unit were not even "gentlemen." In British regiments commissions were bought and sold within a rather restricted group. Therefore any purchaser was, in the current mind, *prima-facie* a "gentleman." Rogers carried on the colonial system of awarding commissions to any man who could enlist a certain number of men. This had its obvious faults which soon appeared in tory and rebel units alike.

A report on Rogers' unit presented the British officers' point of view:

"... Many of those officers were Men of mean extraction without any degree of education suffi-

<sup>11</sup>See e.g. Ralph N. Miller "American Nationalism as a Theory of Nature," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, XII (Jan. 1955), 74-95.

<sup>12</sup>Quoted in *ibid.*, 82.

<sup>13</sup>*Idem.*



cient to qualify them to bear His Majesty's Commission and . . . he (Gen'l Howe) had been deceived by Lt. Col'o Rogers who recommended those men for commissions in the Queens Rangers—in direct violation of a General Order of October, 76—by which Commanding Officers of Provincial Corps were ordered to be particularly careful to inform themselves of such persons as they intended should bear Commissions in the Corps . . . and to Recommend none but such as were Strictly "unexceptionable it can nevertheless be positively proved that many of those officers recommended by Lieu't Col'o Rogers had been bred Mecheanecks others had kept Publik Houses, and One or Two had even kept Bawdy Houses in the City of New York . . . Mr. Brandon both during the time of his being an Officer in the Queens Rangers kept a Tavern and eating house in New York . . . Captain Griffiths kept a dram Shop in the Fly Market New York . . . Captain Eagles was still more illeterate and low bred than Fraser . . . Welsh was the last [least?] exceptionable of them all he had been a petty constable in the City of New York . . ."<sup>14</sup>

Yet something might be said on behalf of Rogers' officers. Daniel Frazer had served for twenty-three years in the regular army. He was wounded at Ticonderoga in '58 and had been recommended to Rogers by a British general for a lieutenancy.<sup>15</sup> John Brandon, who had been a New York resident since the end of the Old French War, in which he had served, was forced in May of '75 to flee to Boston. Here he became first lieutenant in the Loyal Irish Volunteers raised under General Gage. He went to Halifax with the British army when Boston was evacuated and followed it to New York.<sup>16</sup> Patrick Walsh had served fifteen years in the 35th Foot, four years as lieutenant and adjutant

in a Connecticut provincial regiment, and four years in the same rank in a New York unit.<sup>17</sup> John Eagles and John Griffiths had no military experience yet had demonstrated their loyalty as well as some qualifications and leadership by the then American standards. The former had raised a force of fifty-two loyalists in Westchester County at his own expense. He delivered them to Governor Tryon and was sent to Halifax. When the British army arrived, he and his men joined it. Back in New York he raised a company for the Queen's Rangers and also carried dispatches from New York to Quebec.<sup>18</sup> Griffiths' only claim to leadership was that he had allegedly raised a force of almost five hundred men for a projected raid to rescue some tories imprisoned in Albany.<sup>19</sup>

Rogers' unit, as raised originally, included a few captains who were accepted by the British officer class. In particular, there were Gymes and Armstrong, who had been former members of Lord Dunmore's Virginia unit of the same name.<sup>20</sup>

The contempt and coolness of the British officers, who made no effort to conceal their feelings, came as a shock to the loyalists who expected, or at least hoped for, a warmer welcome. Ill-bred or not, tory officers had risked a great deal in raising men for the unit. Take the case of William Lounsbury in Westchester County as described by a witness:

"William Lounsbury, a bold determined man. By General Howe's proclamation if anyone enlisted sixty men he should have a Captain's commission. A counter proclamation from the American Congress, decreed death to anyone caught enlisting for the enemy. Lounsbury was 50 or 60 years old, I believe, and bald. He came from below and a sloop was to wait for his men below

<sup>17</sup>Petition of Captain Patrick Walsh Jan. 13, 1778, MS, *ibid*.

<sup>18</sup>Petition of Captain John Eagles, 11 Jan., 1779, MS, *ibid*.

<sup>19</sup>Petition of Captain John Griffiths, 12 Jan. 1779, MS, *ibid*.

<sup>20</sup>Innes to Clinton, 9 Nov. 1779, MS, *ibid*.

<sup>14</sup>Statement by Major Armstrong et al [no date], enclosed in Innes to Clinton, 9 Nov. 1779, MS, *Clinton Papers*. Here accusations of heinous crimes are joined with complaints about the low social standing of the officers "purged" in March 1777. It is difficult to tell whether the writers were more indignant about the criminal activity of the officers or their low origins and occupations.

<sup>15</sup>Memorial of Captain Daniel Frazer, 26 Jan. 1778 and memorial of same, 1 Dec. 1778, MSS, *ibid*.

<sup>16</sup>Memorial of Captain John Brandon, 1 Dec. 1778, MS, *ibid*.



Delancey's Neck and take them over to Long Island. Lounsbury told his wife to send for Joseph Purdy and tell him he was among the rocks of Great Lot . . . [Purdy came and Lounsbury sent him to such loyalists as he thought could be induced to join with him.] Purdy told the men where Lounsbury was and he persuaded them to enlist. Purdy proved a traitor and informed the principal Whigs of M[amaroneck] vizt: Colonel Gilbert Budd, Gilbert Horton, and Captain Samuel Townsend commanded the party composed of the American Store Guard and the militia company of the vicinity. They marched to the Great Lots before Townsend let them know where or for what they were going.—Surrounding the fastnesses where Lounsbury was concealed, they called upon him and his party to surrender,—they being unarmed. His men attempted to escape but were fired upon and then surrendered. Lounsbury refused to surrender though called upon repeatedly and defended himself with a club. Orders came from the commander to bayonet him, and he was killed with seven bayonets, refusing to the last to yield. They found his enlisting orders in his pockets, and a roll of men whom they secured."<sup>21</sup>

This incident seems to have been the first news received by the rebels concerning Rogers' unit. The local Committee of Safety reported to Washington "That in his [Lounsbury's] Pocket book was found a Commission signed by Genl How to Major Rogers empowering him to raise a Battalion of Rangers with the Rank of Lieut Col Commandant. That annexed to this was a Warrant to this Lounsbury signed by Rogers appointing him Captain of one of these Companies & a Muster Roll of the Men already enlisted."<sup>22</sup>

Washington issued warnings about Rogers' unit in order to kindle patriot fires. On 30 September he wrote Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, that unless the enemy measures

were counteracted, the British would raise an army "of our own people."<sup>23</sup> On 4th October the President of the Continental Congress was told by Washington of the necessity of raising men and of offering a suit of clothes as well as pay and bounty. The general added: ". . . I question whether that will do, as the enemy, from the information of one John Nash, who with six others were taken by our guards, are giving ten pounds bounty for recruiting and have got a battalion under Major Rogers nearly completed, upon Long Island."<sup>24</sup>

Connecticut, meanwhile, worried about Rogers' position, just across the narrow ribbon of Long Island Sound. Governor Trumbull told Washington (13 October) that many of Rogers' men "have lately stole over to join him, and who are perfectly acquainted with every inlet and avenue into the towns of Greenwich, Stamford and Norwalk, where are considerable quantities of Continental stores. The design of Rogers, as far as we can learn, is from Huntington to make a sudden descent in the night more especially on the town of Norwalk, not only to take the stores there, but to burn, and destroy all before them." Trumbull did not expect much from the local militia. "The towns mentioned are much alarmed, especially Norwalk, who have taken an active part in bringing off inhabitants, stock, and stores from Long-Island, and are particularly threatened with reprisals being made on them."<sup>25</sup>

Although Trumbull admitted "the most particular account of Rogers' intentions were from a friendly woman of good character . . .", he enclosed two letters supposedly confirming the proposed raid. To us, today, the letters now appear more interesting as a reve-

<sup>21</sup>Testimony of Nelson Schofield, Nov. 1846, MS, *McDonald Papers*, Vol. III (1845-6), Hufeland Memorial Library, New Rochelle, N. Y.

<sup>22</sup>Committee of Safety to Washington, 30 Aug. 1776, *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts Relating to the War of the Revolution, in the Office of the Secretary of State*, Albany, N. Y. (Albany 1868), Vol. I, 465. (Hereafter cited as "*Cal. N. Y. Hist Ms.*") See also Duerr to Washington, 30 Aug. 1776, *Force*, I, 1236.

<sup>23</sup>Washington to Turnbull 30 Sept. 1776, Peter Force, ed., *American Archives. Fifth Series*. Vol. II (Wash., 1851), 610.

<sup>24</sup>Washington to President of Congress, 4 Oct. 1776, *ibid.*, 868.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 1028-1029.



lation of the thoughts of the writers than of the fears read into them by the patriots. The first<sup>26</sup> was addressed to a friend by a man who had suddenly stolen away from Norwalk. "... I had a good passage over to the island [Long Island] ... I am under Captain Fairchild, in Colonel Rogers's battalion of Rangers, and as to news of the Rebel side I find it as false as ever. I have not heard from home since I came away, and should be exceeding glad if you should send me word. As to my coming away, I must own that my wife as well as all others was ignorant of my coming away, which makes me the more anxious of hearing from home." Almost every other sentence mentions his wife: "I should write my wife above all others, but be kind enough to let her know that I am well ... Be good enough to remember my love to my wife and child, and if she has any desire to see this, let her." The patriots were alarmed by the sentences: "And you may tell her from me that the British troops will never give over until they have gained the victory. And furthermore tell her if she regards her own safety not to forsake her own house when the troops come through the country ... " The other letter<sup>27</sup> is similar: "My love to my wife ... Let her know that I am well and expect soon to see her."

The mention of Rogers' name undoubtedly increased the apprehension of the Connecticut patriots. Every reference to him repeated that he was "a famous partisan or ranger in the last war." His name conjured up visions of silent, grim giants suddenly appearing from nowhere, swooping down, Indian fashion, on a town under cover of darkness. Patriots tried to damn his name: he was, by now, "the infamous Major," but it did not quell the fears of the citizens along the shore.

At first, Rogers apparently established

headquarters at Flushing on the north shore of Long Island. A sloop was used to pick up recruits waiting on the New York and Connecticut shores. During this time (22 September) a celebrated incident occurred about which there has been much speculation. Yet nothing more substantial is known than the brief entry in the diary of Captain William Bamford of the 40th Foot:

"Nathan Hale, a Cap't in ye Rebel Army, & a spy was taken by Maj'r Rogers & this m'g hang'd ..."<sup>28</sup>

There are no records which would show the strength of the Queen's Rangers or tell what uniform they wore at the time that General Howe finally moved his forces (12 October) in pursuit of Washington. There do not seem to have been more than ten companies in Rogers' force, or a strength of about five hundred men. It had been decided to clothe the provincial units in green coats, (lined with white baize), white waistcoats and breeches, and dark brown leggings. The facings were to be white, green or blue. Uniforms and material for the provincials were sent to Howe from Great Britain during 1776 but whether these were received prior to his move into Westchester County cannot be determined.<sup>29</sup>

On 18th October the British army finally began to move on the mainland, having disembarked on Pelham Point. On the 19th it took a position facing East Chester with the right wing stretching towards New Rochelle. Rogers' corps—missing at least seventy-two men, detached on the 17th for work with the artillery—was on this wing. Captain John Eagles later claimed the honor of being the first to enter New Rochelle.<sup>30</sup> (He said he

<sup>28</sup>"Bamford's Diary," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, XXVIII (1938), 10. For a speculative reconstruction of the incident see Morton Pennypacker, *General Washington's Spies on Long Island and In New York*, Vol. II (East Hampton, 1948), 8-15.

<sup>29</sup>Charles M. Lefferts, *Uniforms of the American, British, French, and German Armies in the War of the American Revolution 1775-1783* (N. Y., 1926), 222, 230.

<sup>30</sup>Eagles' Petition of 11 Jan. 1779, *cit. supra*.

<sup>26</sup>J. Cable to Hezekiel Jarvis, 27 Sept. 1776, *ibid.*, 1029-1030.

<sup>27</sup>Stephen Fountain to Darius Olmstead, 28 Sept. 1776, *ibid.*, 1030.



was publicly thanked in the army orders—but this was derided: there is evidence that there had been no opposition.<sup>31</sup> Certainly there is no record of any skirmish at this point.)

On the evening of 20 October, Rogers was ordered to take possession of the village of Mamaroneck. At sunrise the next morning—while the remainder of the British army only shifted its position slightly—his battalion swung into action. The Queen's Rangers attacked and (to quote a contemporary American letter) "took possession of Mamaroneck, which our militia abandoned with the utmost precipitation,—As usual." There had been considerable military stores deposited there for the Americans, but allegedly they were all moved "except some Onions, so that I think they have made a losing voyage."<sup>32</sup>

The Queen's Rangers then camped on Heathcote Hill near the village. The men bivouacked around fires made from neighboring fences. Rogers used a nearby schoolhouse as headquarters and one of the scholars, dismissed for an unexpected holiday, recalled the Colonel many years later as "a very rough looking red eyed man."<sup>33</sup> As night came on, strong outposts were set to the north and east but only a weak one to the west, the direction of the British army.

Meanwhile the Americans were watching the British. Informed of Rogers' position,<sup>34</sup> Lord Stirling (who had been exchanged after being captured during the battle of Long Island) decided to execute a coup, to revive

lagging American morale. Seven hundred and fifty men, of whom six hundred were from Delaware and Maryland, and the remainder from Virginia, were placed under the command of Colonel Haslet of Delaware. They, the cream of the Americans under one of the ablest field commanders, were to attack Rogers under cover of darkness.

Local guides led the Americans around so that they approached the Tory unit from the southwest. Then, nearing the unsuspecting loyalists, the guides swung the Americans cross-country, to make the surprise complete. A single outpost—a young Indian—was easily dispatched with a sword, and the Americans pushed on to complete the coup.

Meanwhile Rogers had become dissatisfied with the positions taken by his unit and had ordered Captain Eagles' company of about sixty men to be stationed on the southwest (Eagles was later accused of being absent at this important moment.<sup>35</sup>). This move was not known to the American guides and when the vanguard composed of Virginians under Major Green attacked the post, the Americans thought they were striking the main body of the loyalists. Surprise as well as overwhelming strength gave the Americans an initial advantage and they expected to sweep all before them. While some Tories quickly surrendered, others took advantage of the confused fighting in the dark at close-quarters and by shouting imprecations against Rogers and his crew, managed to withdraw to the main camp.

Rogers had been aroused at his headquarters by the melee and hurried to join the main body of his troops standing under arms on Heathcote Hill. Exhilarated by their easy victory and expecting only scattered resistance, the Americans pressed on, only to be met by heavy gunfire. Over the din was

<sup>31</sup>Affidavit of William Washburn et al, 5 Nov. 1779, MS, *Clinton Papers*.

<sup>32</sup>Tilghman to Duerr, 22 Oct. 1776, Peter Force, ed., *American Archives, Fifth Series*. Vol. II (Wash., 1851), 576. According to some evidence the Queen's Rangers destroyed large quantities of goods, principally rum, molasses, flour and pork.

<sup>33</sup>Interview with Stephen Hall, 5 Nov. 1846, *McDonald Papers*.

<sup>34</sup>Apparently by Rufus Putnam who had made a one-man reconnaissance. Rowene Buell, comp., *The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Official Papers and Correspondence* (Boston & N. Y., 1903), 61-63.

<sup>35</sup>Affidavit of Washburn et al.



heard Rogers' hoarse voice: "Steady, boys, steady! Fire! Fire!" In the confusion the Americans' guides disappeared. Colonel Haslet decided to withdraw, content with the accomplishments of his initial surprise: thirty-six prisoners, along with a variety of trophies and spoil.<sup>36</sup>

The Americans whipped themselves into delirium over their "victory"—which in sober fact had but the proportions of an outpost overrun and repulse by a numerically inferior band of men.<sup>37</sup> But the Americans did not discuss these details. Instead, Colonel Haslet spread the canard thicker: "the late worthless Major; on the first Fire he skulked off in the dark. . . ."<sup>38</sup> This refrain was taken up and eagerly repeated throughout the colonies—"Major Rogers . . . it is said, was the first that run off. . . ."<sup>39</sup> The newspapers, of course, printed it.<sup>40</sup> Americans gleefully assured one another: "This blow will ruin the Major's Rangers."<sup>41</sup> Lord Stirling, publicly, on parade, thanked the officers and men of the detachment. How he completed the celebration is described in a soldier's diary: "Tuesday 22 [September] . . . there was a gallos ordered by Genl Starling to hang three of the prisoners at 12 o'clock."<sup>42</sup>

Dr. James Tilton, the Delaware regimen-

tal surgeon, while thinking the outpost Rogers' main force—"little or nothing inferior to us in numbers"—admitted: "Though we were successful, I must confess this the most terrible instance of War I have seen; so much is the horror of terrible business increased by darkness."<sup>43</sup> The only really frank statement made by the Americans is contained in the report by Colonel Robert H. Harrison, Washington's secretary, to the President of the Continental Congress: "By some accident or other the expedition did not succeed so well as I could have wished. However, our advanced party led on by Major Greene, of the first Virginia Regiment, fell in with their out-guards, and brought up thirty-six prisoners, sixty muskets, and some blankets. . . ."<sup>44</sup>

General Howe reported the engagement to Lord Germain on 30 November. The initial loss was blamed on the fact that "the carelessness of his centries exposed him [Rogers] to a surprise from a large body of ye enemy by w<sup>h</sup> he lost a few men killed or taken; nevertheless by a spirited exertion he obliged them to retreat, leaving behind them some prisoners & several killed or wounded."<sup>45</sup>

When Americans, returning from behind the British lines under a flag of truce, later reported Rogers the object of open scorn and insult by British officers, patriots were convinced that their propaganda was true. How exaggerated these reports were is difficult to say but there may have been at least an element of truth. An American wrote his father on 1 November:

<sup>36</sup>"List of Prisoners Taken 21st October [1776]," *Force*, II, 1230.

<sup>37</sup>Hall estimated the rangers at 400. Interview of 5 Nov. 1846. I can find no evidence of more than ten companies in the unit and the full strength would be approximately 500. Seventy-two men were detached on the 17th to assist the artillery and not ordered back in time for the battle. There were also 120 detached to the engineers; it cannot be determined if they returned prior to the engagement. Entries for 17, 20 and 22 Oct. 1776 *Orderly Book of Sir William Howe*, Jan. 27, 1776-May 1, 1778, MS, Clements Library.

<sup>38</sup>Haslet to Rodney, 28 Oct. 1776, *Force*, II, 1270.

<sup>39</sup>"Extract of a Letter of a General Officer dated 23 October 1776," *Force*, II, 1203. Rogers . . . is disgraced." Trumbull to Cooke, *ibid.*, 1077.

<sup>40</sup>See e.g. *Connecticut Gazette* quoted in Franklin B. Hough, ed., *Journals of Major Robert Rogers* (Albany, 1883), 277; *New Hampshire Gazette*, 5 Nov. 1776.

<sup>41</sup>Extract of a letter . . . dated 23 Oct. 1776.

<sup>42</sup>Charles Carleton Coffin, ed., "Diary of Capt. Peter Kimball, 1776," *The Granite Monthly*, V (1881) 233.

<sup>43</sup>Tilton to Rodney, 20 Nov. 1776, quoted in Christopher L. Ward, *The Delaware Continentals 1776-1783* (Wilmington, 1941), 81.

<sup>44</sup>Harrison to President of Congress, 25 Oct. 1776, Hough, *Rogers Journals*, 275-276.

<sup>45</sup>Howe to Germain, 30 Nov. 1776, *Force*, III, 922. Most of the details of the encounter given in the text are from the testimonies of Nelson Schofield, 10 Oct. 1844, MS, *McDonald Papers* I, and 10 Nov. 1846; of Stephen Hall 18 Nov. 1846, and of William Griffin, 5 Nov. 1846, MS, *McDonald Papers*, III. Although obviously suspect because of the date when made, these affidavits are supported by contemporary documents to an amazing extent.



"... Roger who command the Rangers in the british service is Disgraced—A flag which went in two days ago to the Enemy were (by being oblig'd to wait an answer) Spectators of a Scene which is pleasing—The Persons who went in with the flag, were sitting in Company with a Col'o McDonald & some other Officers & in comes Rogers, with his hatt on, says, how do you do Gentlemen (meaning our flag of truce) but no reply was made, except by Col'o McDonald, who says, you Dam'd Rascal, why do you Presume to wear your hatt, among Gentlemen—if you are not out of the house immediately I will kick you out, accordingly he went out, Col'o McDonald was heard to say, that you are an Insolent Rascal & if you ever come into Gentlemens Company again, Where I am I will cane you as long as I can feel you—Rogers Reg't is taken from him & given to another officer . . ." <sup>46</sup>

Contrary to patriot propaganda and hopes, Rogers continued to devote his efforts to the corps. Frederick Mackenzie, a British officer, noted in his diary for 26 October:

"Major Rogers, with some of his corps, made an excursion lately as far as Bedford in Connecticut, where he released and brought off 6 or 8 officers and men of the Navy who were prisoners there. He was joined in these two days by a Company of 120 men, raised secretly in Connecticut by one of his old Captains." <sup>47</sup>

Loyalists, too, continued to risk their lives to seek recruits for the Queen's Rangers. Daniel Strong was captured near Peekskill in January 1777 with a commission in his pocket dated 30 December, 1776, authorizing him to recruit for the unit. <sup>48</sup> Strong met his end on Monday, 27th January. Seth Pomeroy recorded in his journal how "the Rev. Mr. Sackett of Cram Pond stood on the cart and prayed and preached an excellent sermon from these words 'Prepare to meet thy God, O Israel.' The whole army paraded in a circle. Gen. McDougal on horseback, the

colonel on horseback, the whole army in a circle round the gallows to hear the sermon and behold the melancholy spectacle." <sup>49</sup>

The American leaders knew Rogers was still in command and tried in vain to destroy the hated corps. In mid-November, while retreating across New Jersey, Washington badly needed the troops he had left with General Charles Lee on the eastern bank of the Hudson. Lee, however, informed him (24 November): "I shou'd march this day with Glovers Brigade but have just received intelligence that Rogers's Corps, a part of the Light Horse, and another Brigade lye in so exposed a situation as to present us the fairest opportunity of carry'g 'em off—if we succeed it will have a great effect, and amply compensate for two days delay." Washington immediately agreed, believing a smashing defeat of Rogers' unit essential. But Lee failed. His excuse is amusing; he blamed "the timidity or caution of the enemy, who contracted themselves into a compact body very suddenly." <sup>50</sup>

In January, the Queen's Rangers were a part of the garrison in Fort Knyphausen (formerly Fort Independence). On the morning of the 18th, an American force under General Wooster suddenly appeared and demanded the fort's surrender. The Hessians in the fort were offered the best terms but the loyalist units were "to surrender at discretion. . . ." The demand was rejected and the Americans soon retired. <sup>51</sup>

Noncombatants in Westchester County, regardless of sympathies, began to suffer from pillaging. Troops on both sides as well as the criminal element present among civil-

<sup>46</sup>Eb Huntington to Jabez Huntington, 1 Nov. 1776, *Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington During the American Revolution* (N. Y., 1915 ?).

<sup>47</sup>Entry for 26 Oct. 1776, *Diary of Frederick Mackenzie*, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1930).

<sup>48</sup>Commission quoted in Hough, *Rogers' Journals*, 277-278. It revealed that rumors of Rogers' removal were false.

<sup>49</sup>Louis Effingham De Forest, ed., *The Journals and Papers of Seth Pomeroy* (New Haven, 1926), 169.

<sup>50</sup>For correspondence between Lee and Washington see *The Lee Papers*. Vol. II 1776-1778 (*Collections of the New York Historical Society for the Year 1872*), (N. Y., 1873).

<sup>51</sup>[Stephen Kemble], *The Kemble Papers*. Vol. I. 1773-1789 (*Collections of the New York Historical Society for the Year 1883*), (N. Y., 1884), 108.



ians were responsible. Undoubtedly men from Rogers' unit participated.<sup>52</sup> But all marauders soon saw how civilians abandoned all resistance at the dread words "Rogers' Rangers!" Soon all were loudly proclaiming their membership in that unit: thus suspicion was directed to a unit the Americans and even some British were happy to condemn.

A typical incident is described in a contemporary affidavit. About one o'clock in the morning of January 13, 1777, Henry Williams, asleep in a house in Bedford, was rudely roused by muskets smashing in the doors. Grabbing a sword, he was barely out of bed when his room became crowded with seven or eight men. Leveling pistols and muskets at him, they "compelled him to surrender a Sword he had in his hand Threatening him with immediate death, or to take said Williams prisoner to Rogers's Rangers declaring themselves to belong to said Core [Corps] and to be King Georges soldiers and they had express orders from said Rogers to bring down to him said Williams dead or live, they endeavoured to force said Williams (without Coat waistcoat or breeches) out of the house. They then broak open some and demanded all the Draws, Desk, and Packages to be opened and with many imprecations and threats continuing Fire Arms at his breast confined [him] to stand sit still, while they robbed and plundered all his premises often repeating with Oathes their violence they took from him and carried away the following particulars and sundry other articles not

yet particularized." If the list of articles in the affidavit is accurate, Mr. Williams was a wealthy man! The victim added details of a picture worthy of Hogarth's brush: "The person who they called Captain put on and wore away said Gown and Surtoute, a good bever hatt with Crope hatt band, sword and one of the pistols, one man put one of the scarlet waistcoat, an other took a worn bever hatt a tall man black hair high Eyebrows took a large old white Bever hat, they put them on their old hatts. . . ."<sup>53</sup>

Similar incidents became a common experience in Westchester County and the inhabitants constantly appealed for protection. In December 1776 they petitioned the New York Provincial Congress, complaining that they were "in continual danger of being made prisoners, and . . . plundered by Robert Rogers' party . . . who daily make excursions in divers parts of said County, and taking with them by Force of arms many of its good inhabitants, also their stock, grain, and every thing etc. . . . laying waste and destroying all they cannot take with them." Patriot troops "instead of protecting its inhabitants from the enemy, did plunder and distress them more than the very enemy themselves, taking off with them our stock, household Furniture, and even our Farming utensils. . . ."<sup>54</sup> In May 1777 the Committee of Safety in Bedford told General Clinton that their town had become a frontier, "there being a Sartain Company of Robers, otherwise Called Rogers Rangers, that keep Consealed in Parts of North Castle & Cortlandt Manor. Hardly a Night Passes but there is Some Roberies Committed or Some of our good men Captivated and Draged in a most Barberous maner to the Enemy. . . ."<sup>55</sup>

<sup>52</sup>The strongest accusations against the unit are contained in the statement of Major Armstrong et al, *cit. supra*. I query if discipline had broken down the British army to the extent that such crimes as described in the statement would have gone unpunished. None of the accused officers were ever officially charged with any crime. If they were guilty and ample proof was available (as Armstrong et al claimed), Innes and Howe spurned an easy and certain way to end their careers which would have left no opportunity for later complaints. In fact the five "purged" officers who later presented memorials to the home government, based their plea largely on the fact that they were not removed by action of any court martial.

<sup>53</sup>*Cal. N. Y. Hist. Ms.*, I, 591-592.

<sup>54</sup>Petition of Inhabitants of Westchester County, 23 Dec. 1776, *ibid.*, 563-564. See also *Force*, II, 371-372.

<sup>55</sup>Committee of Safety to Clinton, 9 May 1777, *Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York, 1777-1795—1801-1804. Military. Vol. I* (N. Y., 1899), 801-802.



By this time, May 1777, Robert Rogers was no longer in charge of the Queen's American Rangers. In January 1777 Alexander Innes was appointed Inspector-General of the Provincial Forces in the British army. He shared the regulars' feeling that most of the provincial officers were not proper persons to hold commissions and objected even to the ranks including "Negroes, Indians, Mulattos, Sailors and Rebel Prisoners. . . ."<sup>56</sup>

Innes leveled charges against Rogers' unit. "Mr. Rogers had introduced into this Corps a number of persons very improper to hold any Commission and their conduct in a Thousand instances was so flagrant that I could not hesitate to tell the General, that untill a thorough reformation took place, he could expect no service from that Battalion which in the course of the winter had been reduced to one fifth of its original strength principally by desertion. . . ."

"On this representation the General determine dthat Lieut Col'o Rogers should retire on his pay and give the Command of the Corps to Lieut Col'o French then Major of the 22nd Regiment. . . ."<sup>57</sup> Rogers quietly stepped aside without protest.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>56</sup>Innes to Clinton, 9 Nov. 1779.

<sup>57</sup>*Idem*.

<sup>58</sup>There were rumors that "Collonel Rogers has been broke for fraud." Affidavit of Henry G. Livingston, 15 Feb. 1777, *Cal. N. Y. Hist. Ms.*, I, 671. An extensive search of available records failed to substantiate this charge. The nearest is a statement in a letter from Simcoe to Evan Nepean in Mar. 1783: "The Queen's Rangers were originally raised by Colonel Rogers to do the duty which their name implies, and his commission expressed. Sir Wm. Howe saw the necessity of such a corps, and Rogers and many of his officers being accused of mal practices, they were placed upon the half-pay list. . . ." *P.R.O.*, C.O. 42/15. Simcoe was obviously referring to the replacement of officers in March 1777 at the time when French commanded the unit. Actually the charges of fraud were made against various officers but none against Rogers. The true story is given by Innes. Rogers continued to recruit. See e.g. Washington to Turnbull, 12 Apr. 1777, John C. Fitzgerald, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799*, Vol. VII (Wash., 1933), 402-403 at 403; Washington to Clinton, 12 Apr. 1777, *ibid.*, 409-410.

<sup>58</sup>Innes to Clinton, 9 Nov. 1779.

With the advent of Major French, the original Queen's American Rangers was—as Innes later pointed out—"to all intents & purposes dissolved and a new one formed. . . ."

The transition period before the appointment of Simcoe, under whom the unit became famous, may be briefly sketched. French had accepted his new position "on the express condition of being permitted to new-model the Regiment and to recommend such Officers only as were deserving of that honor."<sup>59</sup> In March, Captains Brandon, Sanford, Griffiths, McGinnis, Frazer, Fairchild, Gerow and Eagles were dropped.<sup>59</sup> As a palliative they were given three months' full pay and assured that they might apply "for such Commissions as they were qualified for when vacancies happened. . . ."<sup>60</sup> (Later in 1779 five officially protested to higher authorities but without avail.<sup>61</sup>) Two retained their positions: Major Grymes and Captain Armstrong. (The latter continued to serve in the unit throughout the war and became second in command.)

Major French soon resigned and was succeeded by Captain James Wemyss of the 40th. He, too, lasted only a short time. On October 15, 1777, the command was given to Colonel James Graves Simcoe. Although it continued to be considered a provincial unit, the influx of both officers and men, who were not native-born, changed its complexion. It was from this date no more a loyalist group than many of the regular British regiments.

<sup>59</sup>"Copy of the Orders of Col'o Innis [*sic*], the Inspector Gen'l respect'g the Officers of the Queens American Rangers" [Mar. 30, 1779], MS, *Clinton Papers*. Brandon states that twenty-three officers were replaced in the unit. Memorial of John Brandon, 1 Dec. 1778.

<sup>60</sup>Innes to Clinton, 9 Nov. 1779.

<sup>61</sup>See besides the various documents in the *Clinton Papers* cited *supra*, the following: Thos. de Grey to Howe, 10 July 1779, MS, *P.R.O.*, C.O. 5/156, f.283; Howe to Thos. de Grey, 13 July 1779, MS, *ibid.*, f.329; Germain to Clinton, 2 Aug. 1779, C.O. 5/244, f.43; Germain to Howe, 11 Feb. 1780, C.O. 5/157, f.75.



# THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY

BY LOUIS MORTON\*

All too often, those who write about the American military tradition start with the Revolution, or with the beginning of the Federal government. They would have us believe that the founders of our nation created and formulated out of thin air a military policy at once complete and perfect.

To represent the origins of American military policy in this way is of course a distortion. The roots of our military policy, like the beginnings of our representative government and political democracy, are to be found in the early settlements at Jamestown, Plymouth, and elsewhere—in the arrangements the settlers made for their defense. The seeds of our policy go back even further in time—to the experience of the English people.

In this 350th anniversary year of the founding of Jamestown, it is perhaps not out of place to review some of the origins of our national defense establishment. Not only will we understand better why certain things are as they are today. We will also be struck by the fact that many of the problems and solutions of those earlier days are still with us in different form.

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<sup>1</sup>Although there is an extensive bibliography containing material bearing on colonial military institutions, there is no single work on the subject. The records of the colonial legislatures constitute the basic primary source, a portion of which has been reproduced in Arthur Vollmer, *Background of Selective Service*, Mon. No. 1, Vol. II; *Military Obligations: The American Tradition* (1947). The best general treatment is in Herbert L. Osgood, *American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*, I, Chap. XIII, II, Chap. XV. Works dealing with conditions in specific colonies or areas include: P. A. Bruce, *Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century*, Vol. II, Part 4; W. P. Clarke, *Official History of Militia and National Guard in Pennsylvania*, (Phila, 1909), 3 vols; David W. Cole, "Organization and Administration of the South Carolina Militia System" (M.A. Thesis, University of South Carolina); Wesley Frank Craven, *Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Louisiana State U. Press, 1949); Allen

Before the new world settlers left their homes in the old world, they provided for their defense on the unknown continent of America. The businessmen who financed the colonizing ventures had invested too much money to risk the destruction of their property. The religious leaders were practical men, not visionaries, and their hope of attaining freedom from persecution was too strong to allow them to be negligent of their military strength. The British crown, which authorized the expeditions and granted lands, but which took no risks, empowered the colonists to take whatever measures were required (in the words of the Massachusetts Charter of 1628) "to encounter, expulse, repell and resist by force of armes, as well by sea as by lands" any effort to destroy or invade the settlement.

Weapons and military stores were therefore included in the cargo of the ships that came to Virginia and Massachusetts. Among the settlers were experienced soldiers, men specifically engaged to train the colonists in the use of arms, organize them into military formations, and direct them in battle if necessary. Such a man was Captain John Smith, an adventurer and veteran of the religious

French, "Arms and Military Training of our Colonizing Ancestors," *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceeding*, LXVII; A. Hanna, "New England Military Institutions of the Seventeenth Century," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale); Dallas Irvine, "First British Regulars in North America," *Military Affairs*, IX, 1945; Douglas E. Leach, "The Military System of Plymouth Colony," *The New England Quarterly*, XXIV (September 1951); H. Telfer Mook, "Training Days in New England," *The New England Quarterly*, XI (December 1938); S. P. Mead, "The First American Soldiers," *Journal of American History*, I (1907); H. L. Peterson, "Military Equipment of Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay," *New England Quarterly*, XX; J. S. Radabaugh, "The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts," *Military Affairs*, Spring 1954; L. D. Scisco, "Evolution of Militia in Maryland," *Maryland Historical Society*, XXXV (1940); Morison Sharp, "Leadership and Democracy in Early New England Defense," *American Historical Review*, XL (January 1945).

wars on the Continent. Such a man was Captain Myles Standish, hired by the Pilgrims to accompany them to Plymouth.

Not even a John Smith or a Myles Standish could fight off an Indian attack by himself. The settlers had to do that together, and every able-bodied man became in times of military emergency a front-line soldier. There was never any question about this. The obligation of every male who could carry arms to perform military service in the defense of his community was an ancient English tradition dating back to Saxon times. Such documents as the Assize of Arms (1181), the Statute of Westminster (1285), and the Instructions for General Musters (1572) rooted the obligation of military service firmly in English law. As late as 1588, when the Grand Armada threatened invasion, "the rugged miners poured to war from Mendip's sunless caves . . . and the broad streams of pikes and flags rushed down each roaring street" of London to defend the nation against the approaching Spanish fleet.

According to this tradition, which became organized into the militia system, every able-bodied man was considered a potential soldier. He had to train and drill in military formation at stated intervals. By law, he was required to possess arms and equipment and to have them ready for immediate use.

The system was local in character and organized on a geographical basis. It was administered by county and town officials who had full authority to impose punishment and collect fines. Yet English law also restricted the use of the militia to inhibit the crown from using it as an instrument of despotism and from employing it outside the kingdom. The militia, thus, was a military system for emergencies of short duration in defensive situations.

Since this was the military tradition of the colonists, this was the basis of the military

system they employed in the New World. It was admirably suited to their needs. But there was an important difference. In England there had been but a single militia organization; in America there were as many militias as there were colonies. No man would serve in any but his own. "Let the New Yorkers defend themselves," said a North Carolinian of a later day. "Why should I fight the Indians for them?"

Arrived in the New World, the colonists were as much concerned with preparations for defense as with food and shelter. Acting in accordance with instructions from home, the original settlers of Jamestown—100 men and 4 boys—split into three groups upon landing. One group provided fortifications for defense, another furnished a guard and planted a crop, the third explored the nearby area. Within a month after their arrival, they had built a primitive fort, a triangular stockade of "Planckes and strong Posts, foure foot deepe in the ground."

The Puritans, similarly instructed in England, were also militant in defense of their property. As one of their number remarked, "they knew right well" that their church "was surrounded with walls and bulworks, and the people of God, in re-edifying the same did prepare to resist their enemies with weapons of war, even while they continued building."

Probably the first military legislation in the English colonies was the code of laws proclaimed in Jamestown by Sir Thomas Dale in 1612. On military leave from his post in the Netherlands, Dale assumed the governorship of Virginia at a time when the colony was in danger of extinction, its inhabitants on the verge of starvation. The strict regime he imposed, based on existing military regulations and on "the laws governing the Armye in the Low Countreys," was even more severe than the English laws of the period. But it accomplished its purpose.



Order was restored, crops were planted, and peace was made with the Indians. "Our people," wrote John Rolfe, "yearly plant and reape quietly, and travell in the woods a-fowling and a-hunting as freely and securely from danger or treacherie as in England."

Martial law soon outlived its usefulness. As soon as the colony ceased to be a military outpost, the Virginians wrote into civil law the requirements for military service. The Massacre of 1622, which almost destroyed the colony, was still fresh in mind when the General Assembly in 1623 required all inhabitants "to go under arms." Three years later, Governor Yeardley specified that all males between 17 and 60 years of age were to serve when necessary and perform military duty when required. Changes were afterwards made in the law, but the obligation of universal service was never abandoned. Failure to comply subjected the offender to punishment and fine, as one John Bickley discovered when, for refusing to take up arms, he was sentenced to be "laid neck and heels" for 12 hours and pay a fine of 100 pounds of tobacco.

A local official known as the Commander controlled the militia in each district. He was charged with responsibility for seeing that his men were properly armed and supplied with powder and shot. Later, as the population grew and his duties increased, a lieutenant commander was appointed to assist him. The commander's duties were so varied and extensive as to make him the most important person in the community, its chief civilian as well as military official. Not only did he supervise the construction of defenses, drill his units, and have custody of the public gunpowder, but he also saw to it that everyone attended church services and observed the laws relating to the tobacco trade. Though the commissioning of officers remained in the hands of the governor, the commander appointed his own subordinates.

Once a man acquired a military title he retained it. So numerous were the officers produced by this system and so fond were the Virginians of their titles that a visitor in a later period, struck by the abundance of military rank, remarked that the colony seemed to be "a retreat of heroes."

The Pilgrims too lost no time in organizing their defenses. Captain Standish was designated military commander of the colony. Under him were formed four companies, each with its own commander and designated area of responsibility. A visitor at Plymouth in 1627 noted approvingly the defensive works and the careful preparations to meet an attack. "They assemble by beat of drum," he explained, "each with his musket or firelock in front of the captain's door; they have their cloakes on and place themselves in order, three abreast, and are led by a sergeant without beat of drum. Behind comes the governor in a long robe; beside him, on the right hand, comes the preacher with his cloak on, and on the left hand the captain with his side-arms and cloak, and with a small cane in his hand; and so they march in good order, and each sets his arms down near him. Thus they are constantly on their guard night and day."

By the middle of the seventeenth century Plymouth had established a military system based on universal service. Each colonist was required to own and maintain his own weapons, and the governor was authorized by law to prescribe military training. As new towns grew up along the frontier, they were brought into the defensive organization by the requirement to maintain their own companies under the central control of the government at Plymouth. The local companies elected their own officers, subject to approval of the government, and the officers appointed subordinates, selected training days, and drilled their units. Regulations were enforced by fines, collected by the clerk of the com-

pany or the local constable, and these fines often supported the military activities of the community. If the General Court (the legislature) required it, each town provided a quota of men for military expeditions.

The military system of the Puritans was much like that of Plymouth and Jamestown. According to a law of 1631, all males between 16 and 60, whether freemen or servants, were to provide themselves with weapons and to form into units for training. A council was established for the specific purpose of supervising military matters, for, declared the General Court, "the well ordering of the militia is a matter of great concernment to the safety and welfare of this commonwealth." Additional regulations were issued from time to time and in 1643, after the Pequot War, the entire militia system was overhauled. One of the results was the selection of 30 soldiers within each company "who shall be ready at halfe an hour's warning upon any service they shall be put upon." Here in essence are the Minutemen of the Revolution, more than a century later.

As in the other colonies, provision was made in the law to excuse from military service those with "natural or personal impediment" such as "defect of mind, failing of senses, or impotence of Limbes." Certain professions were also exempted—public officials, clergymen, school teachers, and doctors—as were those who practiced critical trades.

The companies established in Massachusetts numbered from 65 to 200 men, two-thirds of whom were musketeers and one-third pikemen. When the number exceeded 200, a new unit was formed; when it was less than 65, several towns combined to form a single unit. The officers elected by the men consisted of the captain, a lieutenant as his principal assistant, an ensign, sergeants, and corporals. The company clerk kept the roster of men liable for military service, checked attendance at drills, and collected the fines.

At an earlier date than any other colony, Massachusetts formed the militia into regiments. The Act of 1636 divided the military companies then in existence into three regiments and required regimental training at first once a year and then every three years. Commanded by a sergeant major, who was assisted by a muster master, the regiment came ultimately to comprise all the units in a county and its strength consequently varied. Plymouth adopted the regimental organization in 1658 when Josiah Winslow was given the rank of major and designated "chief officer over the military companies of this jurisdiction," "All Captains, inferior officers and soldiers," read his orders, "are hereby required to be in ready subjection to you during your continuance in the said office."

Training was the primary activity of the militia, and regular training periods were an integral part of the system. The first drills at Jamestown were held shortly after the colony was founded. Captain Smith, when he became President of the Council, held drills and target practice on a level stretch of ground within plain view of the Indians, who could see for themselves the effect of cannon shot on the trunk of a tree.

Training exercises in Virginia were initially held, by custom, on holy days. In 1639, when a muster master-general was appointed to enforce the militia regulations, even though the captain remained immediately responsible for training their men, no specific time was set by law for drills. In some districts they were held monthly, in others every three months. Failure to attend brought a fine, but absence was apparently so common that the the General Assembly finally set a stiff penalty of 100 pounds of tobacco, declaring that the offenders were bringing about the "ruin of all military discipline." By the end of the seventeenth century the militia regulations in Virginia required an annual drill for the



entire regiment and quarterly exercises for companies and troops.

Training in New England was put on a regular basis earlier than in Virginia. In Plymouth drills were held six times a year to assure, in the words of the General Court, "that all postures of pike and muskett, motions, ranks and files . . . skirmishes, sieges, batteries, watches, sentinells, bee always performed according to true military discipline." The first military law of the Puritans called for weekly training periods, held every Saturday. In 1637, when conditions had become more settled, the number of training days per year was fixed at eight, and this number remained in effect for the next forty years.

From the weekly training of the first settlers to the monthly sessions a few decades later can be measured the decreasing threat of Indian attack. Before the century was out, the number of drills per year had dropped to four, with provisions for two extra days if the unit commander thought them necessary. Regimental drills, when held, were deductible from the total. But during times of emergency, interest in military matters revived phenomenally; during King Philip's War drills were held as often as twice a week.

The military code of the day enforced a strict discipline. A militiaman in Virginia guilty of three offenses of drunkenness had to ride the "wooden horse," an ingeniously uncomfortable and ignominious seat; if drunk on post he was liable to the death sentence. Drunk or sober, if he lifted his hand against an officer, he lost the hand; if he raised a weapon, the penalty was death. Should he express discontent with his lot during a march, complain about the ration, or sell his gun, he was treated as a mutineer.

Imposed freely, fines provided one of the sources for defraying militia expenses. All the colonies had laws fining those who failed to supply themselves with arms or to maintain them properly. Failure to attend drill as

well as quarreling, and drunkenness during the drill were also punishable by fines.

The drill was usually held in a public place, such as the commons in Boston, and began early in the day. After roll call and prayer, the men practiced close order drill, the manual of arms, and other formations to the accompaniment of drums. Then followed a review and inspection by higher officers and public officials. After that, the units might form into smaller groups for target practice and extended order drill. Training closed with a sham battle and final prayers. By now it was early in the afternoon and the militiamen retired for food and other refreshment. The rest of the day was spent in visits, games, and social events.

The manuals provided for a remarkably complicated series of motions for forming troops, marching, fixing the pike, and firing the musket. These were standard in European armies, where the perfection of mechanical motions governed warfare, but they bore no relation to Indian fighting in the forests of North America. Nevertheless, the militiamen in the New World had to go solemnly through the prescribed movements on each training day. Fifty-six separate motions were required to load and fire the matchlock musket; only eleven for the pike, a fact which may account in part for its retention as a weapon and its popularity among troops. It was also a case, not altogether unusual in a more recent day, of the failure of training to keep pace with changing conditions.

The militia was not limited to foot soldiers; horsemen too were included. From the start, cavalry was the favored arm, and cavalymen acquired special privileges that gave them higher status. Few men could afford to supply the horse and equipment required, a fact that limited membership to the well-to-do. Massachusetts, for example, restricted service in the cavalry to those with property valued at 100 pounds sterling.

Many advantages accrued to members of a horse unit. The trooper was exempted from training with the foot companies and from guard duty. He enjoyed special tax privileges; he could not be impressed into another service; he did not have to pay the customary fees for pasturage on common grounds.

The number as well as the quality of militia units varied widely in different periods and among the various colonies. Governor Berkeley of Virginia estimated in 1671 that he could put 8,000 horse in the field if needed, and the following year the militia of the colony consisted of 20 foot regiments and 20 horse, a proportion marking clearly the southerner's preference for cavalry.

Second only to Virginia was Massachusetts, which in 1680 had about the same number of foot companies but fewer companies of horse. Since the number of men in the companies varied so widely, exact comparisons are impossible. For Connecticut exact figures appear in the report made by the governor in 1650. "For the present," he wrote, "we have but one troope settled, which consist of about sixty horse, yet we are upon raising three troopes more. . . . Our other forces are Trained Bands. . . . The whole amount to 2,507."

Though the militia was organized into units, it rarely fought that way. It was not intended to. The system was designed to arm and train men, not to produce military units for combat. Thus, it provided a trained and equipped citizen-soldiery in time of crisis. In this sense it was a local training center and a replacement pool, a county selective service system and a law enforcing agency, an induction camp and a primitive supply depot.

The forces required for active operations against the Indians came usually from the militia. The legislature assigned quotas to the local districts. Volunteers usually filled them. But if they did not, local authorities had the power to impress or draft men, to-

gether with their arms and equipment (including horses), into service. The law on this point was specific. The Virginia Assembly in 1629 gave the commanders power to levy parties of men and employ them against the Indians. In Plymouth during the Pequot War, when each town was required to furnish a quota, some of the men volunteered only on the understanding that if they did not, they would be conscripted.

Service was usually limited to expeditions within the colony, but there were numerous occasions when militiamen were employed outside. This right was specifically recognized in the law. Thus, in 1645, the Massachusetts General Court empowered the governor and council "to raise and transport such part of the militia as they shall find needful" outside the Commonwealth "without their free and voluntary consent" for a period of six months. When the term of service was over, the forces thus raised were dissolved and the men returned to their homes where they resumed their place in the militia.

There was no central command for the militia of all the colonies; each had its own organization and its own commander. Supreme authority within each colony rested usually with the legislative body and was based on the charter. In practice, however, the legislature left the administration of the militia system to other groups, sometimes the Upper House and at other times to various committees or commissions on military affairs or martial discipline.

The utmost care was exercised to maintain civilian supremacy. The General Court of Massachusetts repeatedly asserted its authority over military officials and representatives of the crown. The establishment of the Artillery Company of Boston in 1638 caused some suspicious officials to liken it to the Praetorian Guard in Roman times and to the Knights Templar; care was taken to make certain that the Artillery Company would



not become "a standing authority of military men, which might easily in time overthrow the civil power."

The actual management of war was delegated to the governor and a small group of advisers usually, but the legislature in almost every case retained control of the funds and watched expenditures with a suspicious eye. When an expedition was formed, it was the legislature that gave approval, furnished the money—and later appointed a committee to look carefully into the conduct of operations.

The principal officer of the militia and the only single individual who could be considered to exercise supreme command was, in Massachusetts, the sergeant major-general; in Virginia, the governor. When New Hampshire, New York, and Massachusetts came under royal authority late in the century, command of the militia there passed to the governor also.

The office of sergeant major-general—later shortened to major general—was an elective post and carried with it extensive powers and excellent opportunities for personal profit. In addition to general supervision of the militia, the sergeant major-general mobilized the militia, moved units to threatened areas, and procured arms and supplies. He commanded one of the regiments and had the unique privilege of training his own family. In wartime he commanded the colonial forces in the field, which, on occasion, he himself had raised and equipped.

To overcome the absence of a single unifying military authority in the New World, the colonies of New England formed a confederation in 1643. Representatives of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Haven, and Plymouth came together in Boston and agreed that "inasmuch as the Natives have formerly committed sundry insolencies and outrages upon several Plantations of the English, and have of late combined themselves against us . . . we therefore doe con-

ceive it our bounden duty to enter into a present Confederation among ourselves, for mutuall help and strength." Two commissioners from each colony met as a body, which had authority to declare war, call on the member colonies for funds and troops, select commanders, and unify in other ways the military efforts of the colonies in time of emergency.

Though it lasted 42 years, the Confederation ran into trouble immediately and foundered finally on the rocks of jealousy and conflicting interest. From the outset, Massachusetts contested the right of the Confederation to declare war or draft Massachusetts troops. The dispute came to a head in 1653 when Massachusetts refused to obey a Confederation ruling. There was considerable feeling also about the choice of commander, for no colony was agreeable to placing its troops under an outsider. Like sovereign powers of a later day, each colony was jealous of its prerogatives and quick to object to seeming encroachment on its authority.

In no colony was there a group that resembled a military staff. The need did not exist. In peacetime the various officials of the militia system sufficed; in war the Assembly and the Council of War exercised control over military operations and procured the equipment and supplies needed by the troops. The commander was always adjured to take counsel of his assistants, and he was expected to abide by their advice. In this sense the various councils were policy-making bodies rather than staffs.

Supplying the military forces of the colonies was a comparatively simple matter. The first procurement agencies were the joint stock companies that had financed the original settlements, but by the middle of the century responsibility had devolved upon the colonists. The procurement of individual arms and equipment was, in general, the responsibility of each militiaman. Every colony

required each householder to provide for himself and his family weapons and equipment, and specified the type and condition of both. The community itself provided for the poor who served out the cost of their arms in labor. In addition, most colonies required the local authorities to keep on hand a supply of weapons and powder for emergencies, to be paid for by the town or county.

Normally there was no need for commissary or quartermaster in Indian warfare. Operations were of brief duration and the militiaman provided his own weapons, ammunition, clothing, and provisions, for which he was usually recompensed.

Extended operations, though uncommon, could hardly be supported in so informal a manner and there were in each colony various regulations and officials to provide the materials of war. In Massachusetts there was from earliest time an officer—variously known as surveyor of ordnance, overseer of the arms, or surveyor general—who had charge of weapons and ammunition. The officer was responsible for making certain that the towns had a supply of powder and ammunition; he also kept records and made purchases for the colony. Commissaries were appointed when required and were given authority to collect provisions. Two such officers designated for a force numbering 200 men sent against the Indians in 1645 were directed to procure bread, salted beef, fish, flour, butter, oil, cereals, sugar, rum, and beer. Only occasionally were such officials required to purchase arms.

When the colony needed funds for an expedition, it could fix quotas for the counties, borrow from private individuals, or impose special taxes. All methods were followed. The General Assembly in Virginia customarily set levies on the counties and imposed taxes payable in tobacco. In 1645 the expense of an expedition of 80 men to Roanoke was met by a levy of 38,000 pounds

of tobacco to pay for the hire of boats, the purchase of provisions, powder, and shot, and the payment of surgeons' salaries. The pay of the men alone amounted to 8,000 pounds of tobacco. Those suffering injuries received special compensation. The levy was made against three counties, each tithable person paying about 30 pounds of tobacco.

Even in that era war was a costly business and a fearful drain on the economy. In the greatest Indian war of the century—against King Philip—Massachusetts spent 100,000 pounds sterling, an enormous sum for that day. And though the legislature fixed prices and dealt harshly with profiteers, the war debt at the close of hostilities was larger than the aggregate value of all the personal property in the colony.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the militia system was firmly established in the American colonies. Though the training it afforded was less than adequate and the number of training days had steadily declined as the frontier moved westward, the system had become deeply imbedded in the traditions and laws of the colonists. Under this system they had defended their settlements, driven back the Indians, and preempted the most desirable lands along the Atlantic seaboard. A century of military experience had made little impression on the method of instruction, but it had demonstrated to the colonists that a military system based upon the obligation of every able-bodied citizen to bear arms provided a practical solution to their defense needs. Other problems would arise later that could not be solved by this method alone, but the militia system, in one form or another, remained an integral part of the nation's military policy for almost two more centuries. The obligation of universal service on which it was based, though often ignored, has never been abandoned. It constitutes yet today the basis of our military organization.



# THE ARMY AND THE STRATEGIC BOMBER

1930 - 1939

BY ROBERT W. KRAUSKOPF\*

## I

IT IS axiomatic in our day, pending the full development and perfection of the entire range of guided missiles, to regard the strategic bomber as the most effective weapon in our air arsenal and to regard the air arm as entirely qualified for and capable of independent operations; our military leadership, it need hardly be added, believes that the air arm, through these independent operations, is capable of exerting a decisive influence upon the outcome of a war. These commonplace observations of 1957 would have been considered heretical and revolutionary by all but a small minority of the men who were in a position to control the development of our military air power of a quarter of a century ago. The factors, military and technological, involved in this fundamental transformation in American military concepts, are deserving of a careful analysis, and it is with the struggle for the achievement of that transformation that this paper is concerned.

When the first airplane flew it immediately presented a problem as to the nature of its most effective military use. It became apparent before long that it could be employed as (a) an auxiliary arm of the surface forces; (b) an autonomous arm; or (c) a combina-

tion of both. The relatively imperfect nature of the aircraft employed in the first World War confined them mainly to the auxiliary arm status. The principal exception to this rule, General Trenchard's Independent Force in the British Royal Air Force organization, had as its objective long-range bombing operations against Germany's war industries.<sup>1</sup> From this very early beginning the concept of strategic air warfare was closely related to the idea of the independent air force, and the long-range or "strategic" bomber came to be looked upon as the basic tool of independent air operations.

One of the first official acknowledgments of the importance of strategic aviation in the United States Army was the far-sighted report of the Lassiter Board, submitted in 1923. This conceded the need for ground support aviation, serving as an integral part of the ground forces organization, but also advocated massing the bulk of offensive aviation into a semi-independent striking force to carry out strategic missions in areas remote from the ground combat zone.<sup>2</sup> Strong differences of opinion within the War De-

<sup>1</sup>Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. I, *Plans and Early Operations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 15, 37; Cf. James L. Cate, "Development of Air Doctrine, 1917-41," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. I, No. 3 (Winter 1947), p. 15.

<sup>2</sup>Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 283.

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partment and jurisdictional conflicts between the Army and the Navy made it impossible at the time to put into effect these recommendations.<sup>3</sup> The Air Corps Act of 1926, however, converting the erstwhile Air Service into the Air Corps, represented a small step in the direction foreshadowed by the Lassiter Board; it conferred greater prestige upon the air arm, added some air personnel to the General Staff, and authorized a five-year program of expansion in personnel and equipment.<sup>4</sup>

## II

To the disciples of air power, however, the very slight improvements embodied in the Air Corps Act gave no real satisfaction, as the air arm remained tied to the ground forces. The significance of offensive aviation was still unrecognized and the organizational structure that would allow it to be concentrated for the performance of an independent mission was not provided.

The underlying reason was not far to seek. In every way still an integral part of the Army, the Air Corps was subject to the control of the War Department and the General Staff, and in these circles no particular sympathy existed for the concept of the independent air mission. General Pershing in 1918 had conceived the proper function of aviation in battle to be "to drive off hostile airplanes and procure for the infantry and artillery information concerning the enemy's movements."<sup>5</sup> This became the official attitude of the War Department. Throughout the 1920's the General Staff was concerned with the airplane primarily for its utility in close support, and it vigorously denied any

official sanction of the independent air mission idea, especially when advocated and expounded by such zealots as General Mitchell.<sup>6</sup> Even in later years, after the swift progress of technology had caught up with the most advanced ideas on air power, this skeptical and unsympathetic attitude persisted. George H. Dern, Secretary of War in the first Roosevelt administration, denounced the concept of mass bombing as the "phantasy of a dreamer" and advocated adhering to traditional defense measures rather than attempting "to purchase freedom with gadgets." His successor, Harry H. Woodring, showed no disposition to alter these viewpoints.<sup>7</sup>

Public opinion in the United States strongly upheld these attitudes, though for different reasons. In the modern era, with its idea of the "nation in arms," it was increasingly difficult to distinguish between military and civilian objectives. One of the clearest implications of total warfare as it applied to the air was that defenseless civilians would inevitably be bombed. Bombing came to be classed in the public mind as closely akin to the criminal in warfare, an attitude reinforced by the speculations of publicists who conjured up nightmares of what total war would mean with poison gas and bacteria rained down from aircraft. An attempt was made at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933 to outlaw all aerial bombing, but this proved futile, and both the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War were characterized by the indiscriminate bombing of non-military objectives.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, the strategic air weapon by its very nature was offensive. But America be-

<sup>3</sup>R. Earl McClendon, *The Question of Autonomy for the United States Air Arm, 1907-1945*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Documentary Research Division, Air University, 1950), p. 140.

<sup>4</sup>Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

<sup>5</sup>John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931), Vol. II, p. 337.

<sup>6</sup>Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 43.

<sup>7</sup>"The Strategic Bomber," *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Summer 1955), p. 100.

<sup>8</sup>Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 150; Eugene M. Emme, "Some Fallacies Concerning Air Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 299 (May 1955), p. 15.



tween-wars was defensive-minded, and that in the narrowest sense. The prevailing national sentiment was isolationist; we had finished with "foreign" wars and if we ever did become involved in war again it would only be in opposing a direct attack upon American soil. This was so completely a national policy imposed upon the Army that to all effects it became a guide to Army planning.<sup>9</sup> Upon more than one occasion the application of this policy had a crippling effect upon Air Corps plans. In August 1936, for example, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, argued against an Air Corps proposal to procure an experimental long-range bomber of the largest type (the future Douglas B-19) in the following terms:

... Research and development must proceed, but not ... in a direction contrary to our National and military policies. The subject airplane is distinctly an airplane of aggression. It can bomb points in Europe and South America and return without refueling. It has no place in the armament of a nation which has a National Policy of good will and a Military Policy of protection, not aggression.<sup>10</sup>

In the view of the War Department the Air Corps had no special standing; its weapons and individual misison contributed only their proper share, no more, to the accomplishment of the general mission of the Army. The Department had the responsibility of providing suitable modern equipment and appropriate tactical organization for all of the combatant arms and services. The demands of Infantry, Cavalry, and Coast and Field Artillery had to receive equal consideration with those of the air arm, so long as the latter was an organic part of the Army, and the slim budgets of the 1920's and 1930's could never possibly provide all that was desired and held necessary for the proper per-

formance of the mission of each arm. In any given budget the General Staff had to weigh the cost of an additional squadron of bombers against the re-equipment of a tank battalion or the provision of a new harbor defense battery, its object being to achieve the best balanced forces it could with regard for the international situation and for the policy and fiscal limitations within which it had to work. Complaints came from all quarters, those of the Air Corps being only one part of the general outcry.

### III

Within the Air Corps itself the authoritative doctrines of the General Staff and the several schools of the ground arms were, in general, given no more than lip service. The concept of strategic air war that began with Trenchard and Mitchell in 1918 and was subsequently clarified, elaborated, and widely spread by the writings of Douhet and Mitchell, dominated thinking at the Air Corps Tactical School.<sup>11</sup> Instructors and students alike were caught up by this vision of air power despite official disapproval and the practical drawback that these concepts called for aircraft and equipment that were still beyond the capacity of the aviation industry to produce. As early as 1920 the School taught that bombing aviation constituted the fundamental arm of an air force, and from 1926 onward it held that the real mission of air power was not merely to drive off hostile aircraft and perform reconnaissance for the ground forces but to destroy the enemy's capacity for waging war by neutralizing his air force and attacking his vital centers. These concepts emerged originally in a text entitled *Employment of Combined Air Force*, published in that year, and subsequently revised many times under the title *Air Force*.<sup>12</sup>

Although the War Department continued

<sup>9</sup>Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>10</sup>National Archives [hereinafter cited "NA"], RG 94, file AG 452.1 (5-8-35) (1), G-4 memorandum for Chief of Staff, August 8, 1936, re Project D Airplane.

<sup>11</sup>Dale O. Smith, *U. S. Military Doctrine*, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955), p. 5.

<sup>12</sup>"The Strategic Bomber," pp. 94-95.

to scoff at such ideas as the theorizing of would-be "empire builders," they gained momentum in the early 1930's, as superior and more suitable aircraft were developed, and began to emerge in definite and detailed form. Independence of tactical demands; the need for longer range than had previously been attainable; and the technique of precision bombing, which helped to offset public opposition to mass civilian bombing—all of these were further aspects of the strategic bombing concept that were formulated into Air Corps doctrine.<sup>13</sup>

Air Corps thinking with regard to the military characteristics of bombing aircraft also produced a conflict with the views of the War Department; in this sphere, in fact, lay the root of the long controversy that was to keep the two at loggerheads throughout the later 1930's. During the twenties Air Corps officers, following the precedent developed during the war in Europe and subsequently standardized among other air powers, advocated the development of two distinct classes of bombing aircraft: (1) a type with high speed and considerable defensive power but short range and small bomb load, suitable for day operations; (2) a bomber with minimum defensive power, long range, and heavy bomb load, suitable for night work.<sup>14</sup> In 1928, partly for reasons of economy, the War Department registered its opposition to this policy of specialization and recommended concentration upon a single, all-purpose bomber.<sup>15</sup>

Air Corps technical experts promptly objected that the result of such a decision would inevitably be a "mediocre" type of bomber, and the War Department, after some months of discussion, refrained from pressing the matter further. Although the question had been debated in the traditional terms of day

and night bombing, the Air Corps Tactical School in 1930 felt that such a distinction tended to be misleading and that it would be clearer to distinguish instead between light and heavy bombers. Such a classification, with the subsequent addition of a "medium" category, became the rule. From this stage the distinction shifted almost imperceptibly to the factor of range, and the real test of policy came a few years later on the issue of short-range light or medium bombers *versus* long-range heavy bombers.<sup>16</sup>

Air Corps thinking also reflected a keen awareness of the influence of geographical factors upon United States air strategy. With friendly neighbors to the north and south and vast oceans to the east and west, and a purely defensive policy, it was apparent that the United States was subject to no serious threats except those that must come across the water from overseas. For the immediate future it was clear that foreign aggression could be brought to bear upon the United States only by expeditions of hostile armies supported by naval air forces, or by air attacks launched from bases seized in the Western Hemisphere. Given these conditions, "the modern bombardment airplane," could, in the opinion of Air Corps leaders, "be considered only as a powerful instrument of defense. . . ."<sup>17</sup>

One of the main difficulties arising from this geographical isolation, however, was that reinforcement of the air defenses of Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, which were our farthest advanced outposts and would logically be an enemy's first target, might very well be impossible before they were compelled to withstand a major attack.<sup>18</sup> The solution

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>17</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (6-1-37) (1), letter from Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, to The Adjutant General, June 1, 1937.

<sup>18</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 580 (3-15-33), letter from the Acting Chief of the Air Corps (Gen. Westover) to The Adjutant General, March 15, 1933.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 99; Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

59.

<sup>15</sup>Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, p. 59.



of this thorny problem was a leading concern of the Air Corps.

The interception and destruction of enemy surface fleets was traditionally a naval rather than an air mission, and, although there had always been a role in coastal defense for the Army and its aviation, the Navy was strongly averse to seeing its normal functions usurped or interfered with. The concept of the land-based bomber as a weapon of defense over the high seas, at great distances from the coastline was, therefore, consistently opposed by the Navy.

#### IV

Efforts to settle this perplexing inter-service dispute and make an authoritative determination of the respective areas of responsibility of the land-based and sea-based air arms began as far back as 1920,<sup>19</sup> but for more than a decade it was impossible to produce a definitive solution of the problem.

In January 1931, at last, a personal meeting between the Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William V. Pratt, produced a statement of policy that, in their opinion, settled the question completely. The vital terms of this agreement were as follows:

The Naval Air Force will be based on the fleet and move with it as an important element in solving the primary missions confronting the fleet. The Army Air Forces will be land-based and employed as an essential element to the Army in the performance of its mission to defend the coasts both at home and in our overseas possessions, thus assuring the fleet absolute freedom of action without any responsibility for coast defense.<sup>20</sup>

The War Plans Division of the General Staff thereupon undertook a detailed study on the basis of which the Chief of Staff in January 1933 issued a circular letter entitled "Employment of Army Aviation in Coast

Defense." This directive specifically required the Army air arm "to conduct the land-based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas possessions;" it further defined the operational role of Army aviation as including not only support of, and cooperation with, the ground defenses but also reconnaissance and offensive operations between the outermost limit of its radius of action and the line of contact with ground forces.<sup>21</sup>

The Chief of the Air Corps fully appreciated the significance of this reformulation of policy. In his words, ". . . The full responsibility for the air defense of our coasts . . . rests with the War Department. The coastal air defense of the United States has been relinquished by the Navy. Until it is physically undertaken by the War Department, there actually will be no coastal air defense of the United States."<sup>22</sup>

The Air Corps felt acutely that it lacked both the equipment and the organization to carry out this newly approved mission, as it understood it. The Chief of the Air Corps had emphasized to the General Staff the constantly growing danger of carrier-borne attack on our coasts and the consequent necessity of preventing hostile naval aviation from approaching within striking range. Air Corps exercises held in the spring of 1933 on the West Coast dealt with the problem of repelling an enemy seaborne expedition; these emphasized the overriding importance of the high-performance bomber in accomplishing such a mission. This experience confirmed and gave added impetus to earlier trends of thought about bombing aircraft and led to the decision of the Air Corps in the same year to take the first practical steps looking toward the development of a new type of bomber combining very long range, heavy

<sup>19</sup>*Final Report of the War Department Special Committee on Army Air Corps*, July 18, 1934 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 23. Hereinafter cited as *Baker Board Report*.

<sup>20</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 580 (1-10-31) (1).

<sup>21</sup>Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>22</sup>NA, RG 94, file AGO 580 (3-15-33), Actg. Chief of the Air Corps (Gen. Westover) to The Adjutant General, March 15, 1933.

bomb load, and high speed.<sup>23</sup> The course and outcome of this project will be considered in detail in another context.<sup>24</sup>

The finality with which the War Department and the Air Corps had regarded the MacArthur-Pratt agreement was not borne out by the course of subsequent events. The Navy Department considered the agreement a purely personal one, binding only during Admiral Pratt's tenure of office; upon his retirement in June 1933 it was promptly repudiated by his successor, Admiral Standley, and the old controversies were revived.<sup>25</sup> Late in 1934 the Joint Board, in its "Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force," made a new pronouncement on the role of Army aircraft in coastal defense. It emphasized the primary responsibility of the fleet and, while repeating much of the Chief of Staff's language in the directive of January 1933, clearly implied that such participation by Army aviation would be needed only in situations that might develop in the absence of sufficient naval force to defeat or repulse the enemy at sea.<sup>26</sup>

At this point the controversy, on the doctrinal level at least, appears to have subsided for nearly half a decade,<sup>27</sup> but one more violent flare-up occurred on the operational level.

The Air Corps received its first few four-engine long-range bombers, Boeing B-17's, in 1937. During joint Army-Navy maneuvers in May 1938, three of these were dispatched on a navigational exercise that took them over 600 miles out into the North Atlantic to intercept the Italian liner *Rex*. The "target" was successfully located and the Air Corps saw to it that the incident was pub-

licized in the press. The Navy Department's reaction was swift and emphatic, and the War Department promptly issued an order prohibiting Army aircraft from executing flights more than 100 miles beyond the coastline. This directive, strange to say, apparently remains in effect, as there is no record of its having been rescinded.<sup>28</sup> Although it presumably applied only to peacetime conditions, it left no doubt as to what the War and Navy Departments regarded as a normal and proper sphere of operations for Army aviation in relation to coastal defense.

Meanwhile, at the same time that this issue of Army-Navy relationships was being debated, the question of the proper role and organizational structure of the Air Corps within the Army itself was once again revived. The shortcomings and inadequacies disclosed when the Air Corps was called upon in the spring of 1934 to carry the mails led to the appointment of a board, under the chairmanship of Newton D. Baker, to make a "constructive study and report" upon the operations of the Air Corps as an agency of national defense.

## V

The Baker Board's report, submitted in July 1934, took a decidedly negative stand on the question of greater autonomy for the Air Corps and the value of independent air operations. Going back to the experience of the first World War, the Board declared that "independent air missions had little if any effect upon the issue of battles and none upon the outcome of the war."<sup>29</sup> It believed that conditions had not changed significantly in the intervening years, at least so far as

<sup>23</sup>Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-65.

<sup>24</sup>See below, pp. 90-93.

<sup>25</sup>Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>26</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 580 (9-11-34) (1).

<sup>27</sup>Until the Air Board in 1939 restated the Air Corps mission in terms applicable to the conditions of World War II.

<sup>28</sup>Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177; Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, p. 69. The order apparently resulted from a verbal agreement between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff and was transmitted verbally to the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force. The War Department was unable to supply a copy of it to the Chief of the Air Corps upon demand. These facts cast doubt upon its authenticity, but responsible and authoritative sources are in agreement that it was actually issued.

<sup>29</sup>Baker Board Report, p. 19.



the United States was concerned, for it contended that

The ideas that aviation, acting alone, can control the sea lanes, or defend the coast, or produce decisive results in any other general mission contemplated under our policy are all visionary, as is the idea that a very large and independent air force is necessary to defend our country against air attack.<sup>30</sup>

The terms "air invasion of the United States" and "air defense of the United States" were, in its opinion, "conceptions of those who fail adequately to consider the effect of ocean barriers and other limitations."<sup>31</sup> In general, the Board held closely to the conventional and prevailing view that a close integration of air and ground establishments was desirable, with ground forces predominant in numbers and influence.

Although denying most of the claims of the airmen, the Baker Board did make one important concession to them. Acting on the basis of a previous War Department study,<sup>32</sup> it recommended the establishment of a General Headquarters [GHQ] Air Force, to be composed of all Air Corps combat units, organized and trained as a homogeneous organization. This force would come under the direct control of the Chief of Staff in time of peace, under the commander of the Army field forces in wartime. The Chief of the Air Corps would remain responsible only for the supply, procurement, and training functions of the air arm, under normal War Department direction.<sup>33</sup>

The War Department put its approval upon this recommendation, and the necessary reorganization was carried out early in 1935. Tactical units scattered throughout the con-

tinental United States were assigned to the new GHQ Air Force, with headquarters at Langley Field, Virginia; Major General Frank M. Andrews was appointed Commanding General of the organization.<sup>34</sup>

It has been suggested that the War Department's motives for this step were not based exclusively upon considerations of the soundest tactical employment of Army aviation. A reorganization along these lines could also be expected to weaken, if not altogether silence, the clamor for a completely separate air force, which had been going on both inside and outside the Army since the days of Mitchell. In addition, it very clearly strengthened the grip of the General Staff upon the Air Corps and considerably diminished the stature and authority of the office of Chief of the Air Corps.<sup>35</sup>

Notwithstanding these aspects of the situation, the airmen in general welcomed the advent of the GHQ Air Force. It had many drawbacks, which quickly came to light, but its mere existence was, to most Air Corps officers, a vast step forward. In the view of a future Chief of the Air Corps, it was "the nearest thing to an independent Air Force yet realized,"<sup>36</sup> and, as the War Department had foreseen, it was widely accepted by advocates of the independent Air Force as the best solution attainable, even General Andrews subscribing to this view.<sup>37</sup>

The Air Corps realized that while the new organization represented an apparent concession by the General Staff in allowing the air arm a more positive role in national defense, there was nothing to indicate any similar change of position by the General Staff on the crucial issue of long-range or strategic bombing. The attitude of the Baker Board, indeed, pointed in the opposite direction. But

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>32</sup>That of the Drum Board, completed some months before; its conclusions and recommendations are included in the *Baker Board Report*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>33</sup>*Baker Board Report*, pp. 29-30. The concept of a GHQ Air Force such as this had figured for several years in War Department plans, to be implemented in the event of hostilities.

<sup>34</sup>Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>35</sup>McClendon, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.

<sup>36</sup>Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>37</sup>Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

the Air Corps now, at last, possessed an organizational structure that facilitated the performance of strategic bombing operations. After 1935, therefore, much of the energy of the Air Corps was devoted to linking the mission of the GHQ Air Force to an ambitious program of bomber development. The Army airman was, thereafter, more than anything else, a champion of the long-range bomber and centered his aspirations around the potentialities of that type of aircraft.<sup>38</sup>

## VI

Developments in the fields of doctrine and organization had a corresponding influence in the field of equipment and *vice versa*. To a great degree the attitudes and policies of the Air Corps in the 1930's reflected the application to military aviation of the great technological advances achieved by the aviation industry during that decade.

The standard bombardment aircraft in service in the Army Air Corps in 1930 differed relatively little in external appearance and performance characteristics from those employed at the close of the first World War. The state of the art had advanced only slightly between the introduction of the Handley-Page and Martin twin-engine biplane bombers of 1918 and the adoption of the Keystone and Curtiss bombers, of the same twin-engine biplane formula, that equipped most of the bombardment units of the Air Corps from 1929 to 1934.<sup>39</sup>

A period of transition to more advanced concepts of design began in 1931 with the appearance of two revolutionary aircraft, the Boeing B-9 and Martin B-10, in competition for an Air Corps procurement award. These two bombers, incorporating such advanced features as monoplane design, all-metal construction, and retractable landing gear, rep-

resented the greatest single advance in bombing aircraft since 1918 and had a profound effect upon subsequent multi-engine designs, both for military and commercial use. Both were capable of speeds in the vicinity of 200 miles per hour, rivaling the performance of contemporary pursuit types, and were by far the fastest aircraft in their weight class.<sup>40</sup> The Martin B-10 proved slightly the better of the two and was put into quantity production for the Air Corps in 1933, replacing the Keystone models as the standard medium bomber.

For all its superiority in speed and general efficiency, however, the B-10 did not possess appreciably greater range and load carrying capacity than its predecessors.<sup>41</sup> In these respects it was still entirely inadequate, in the view of the Air Corps, either for the new mission of coastal defense or for direct reinforcement by air of any of the overseas possessions. A much larger, longer-range type, exploiting more of the potentialities that aircraft like the B-10 had revealed, was needed.

In July 1933, therefore, the Materiel Division of the Air Corps was asked to prepare an engineering study to determine the maximum practical range for which a new bomber might be designed, assuming that it should be capable of carrying a 2,000-lb. bomb load. The Materiel Division's conclusions, submitted late in the year, showed that it would be practicable to build a landplane bomber of this capacity capable of operating to a maximum range of 5,000 miles at a maximum speed of 200 miles per hour.<sup>42</sup> These striking potentialities and the long development time necessary (it was estimated that three years would be needed for the design,

<sup>40</sup>"The Strategic Bomber," pp. 97-98; Thomas Collison, *Flying Fortress* (New York: Scribner's, 1943), p. 6.

<sup>41</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (11-3-33) (1) Sec. 2, Air Corps Technical Report No. 3952, May 3, 1934, Parts 3 and 4.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, file AG 112.05 (11-15-32) (1) Sec. 2, Memorandum of December 12, 1933, by General Westover for the Deputy Chief of Staff.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup>James C. Fahey, *U. S. Army Aircraft, 1908-1946* (New York: Ships and Aircraft, 1946), pp. 9, 15, 22.



construction, and testing of a prototype) prompted the Chief of the Air Corps to seek authorization at once for the initiation of a formal development project.

General Foulois laid the proposal before the Chief of Staff early in December 1933, stressing the urgency and practicability of the project and emphasizing the usefulness of an airplane that could fly non-stop to Panama or Hawaii or, alternatively, could defend either coast of the continental United States while operating from bases as far away as the opposite coast.<sup>43</sup>

The General Staff felt more than a little doubt as to the soundness of the proposal. The War Plans Division, in particular, believed that the same amount of money<sup>44</sup> would be better spent on the development of a long-range reconnaissance aircraft, for which it felt there was a greater need, or better yet, on a larger number of standard bombers to be stationed in Hawaii, Panama, and on both coasts of the United States. It also raised the important question of the value of having a bomber of longer range than its pursuit escort; only if the bomber's own defensive strength were augmented would this problem be solved.<sup>45</sup> In the opinion of G-4, however, it was unwise and dangerous "for the General Staff to attempt to decide the course of development of pertinent equipment, after having assigned a mission;"<sup>46</sup> it pointed out to the War Plans Division that the lessons learned in building the bomber could well be applied to a long-range reconnaissance type, and that, in any event, three years would have to elapse before the new design could be put into production.<sup>47</sup> In the end, the War Department gave

its approval,<sup>48</sup> and "Project A" as it was henceforth known, got under way.<sup>49</sup>

The Air Corps had originally contemplated negotiating with a single manufacturer for the new bomber, but in the spring of 1934 it proposed that, in view of the great importance of the project, two bombers should be developed through the design and engineering phases, one by Boeing and one by Martin, and that the more satisfactory of the two should then be selected for actual construction.<sup>50</sup> The War Department welcomed this suggestion, for it was in accord with its established policy of discouraging monopolies and would tend to safeguard the success of a project that represented "not a step but a leap forward."<sup>51</sup>

Early in 1935 the two designs were completed and evaluated, and the Materiel Division recommended that the one submitted by Boeing be chosen for construction;<sup>52</sup> on June 29, 1935, accordingly, the Boeing Company was awarded the contract for the long-range bomber prototype, which was officially designated model XB-15.<sup>53</sup> Because of its

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, indorsement of December 18, 1933, to the Chief of the Air Corps. The Deputy Chief of Staff (General Drum) injected a note of inter-service rivalry into his recommendation; he felt that "from a psychological viewpoint, certainly our Air Corps men should have as much opportunity to make long range flights to create publicity and esprit de corps as the Navy . . ." (*ibid.*, Memorandum of December 16, 1933, for the Chief of Staff).

<sup>49</sup>Military characteristics of the Long-Range Bombardment Airplane, as approved by the War Department May 16, 1934, included the following features: high speed 180 m.p.h. or more, cruising speed 120 m.p.h. or more, endurance 42 hours at cruising speed, armament 6 machine guns, bomb load of 2,000 lbs. (or, with reduced fuel load, up to 8,000 lbs.), crew of 6. (NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (11-3-33) (1) Sec. 1).

<sup>50</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 112.05 (11-15-32) (1) Sec. 2, memorandum of April 27, 1934, Foulois to The Adjutant General.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, G-4 memorandum of May 5, 1934. War Department sanction was given May 15, 1934.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, file AG 452.1 (11-3-33) (1) Sec. 2, memorandum by General Foulois dated February 5, 1935.

<sup>53</sup>"The Strategic Bomber," p. 102. The companion project by Martin was designated XB-16 (Fahey, *op. cit.*, p. 22).

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, memorandum of December 5, 1933.

<sup>44</sup>\$609,300 (*ibid.*, memorandum of December 9, 1933).

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, memorandum of December 29, 1933, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, to G-4.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, memorandum of December 15, 1933.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, memorandum of January 6, 1934.

extraordinary size,<sup>54</sup> exhaustive research and experimentation had to be undertaken during its construction, which occupied nearly two years.

Test flights of the aircraft in 1937 and 1938 revealed that its size and weight had been conceived on a scale too ambitious for the power plants then available. It had been expected that 2500-horsepower motors would be available for it, but these were not yet out of the experimental stage, and engines of lesser power had to be substituted. Its performance, in consequence, did not fulfill expectations.<sup>55</sup> The engineering lessons learned in its construction proved invaluable, however, in building subsequent types of strategic bombers; the project, moreover, had already given rise to several offshoots, one of which had materialized in the form of the eminently successful B-17.<sup>56</sup>

The Air Corps was not discouraged by these results and in the spring of 1938 requested funds for the construction of an improved version of the XB-15, to be known as the YB-20, incorporating more powerful engines and many refinements in design.<sup>57</sup> By that time, however, the attitude of the General Staff toward long-range bombers had hardened and the request was bluntly refused,

<sup>54</sup>The wing span of the aircraft was 149 ft. (7 ft. more than the later B-29) and loaded weight 65,000 lbs., making it the largest landplane ever constructed in the United States up to that time ("The Strategic Bomber," pp. 134-135).

<sup>55</sup>William B. Huie, *The Fight for Air Power* (New York: L. B. Fisher, 1942), p. 79.

<sup>56</sup>It should be observed that as late as October 1935, after the B-17 had made its debut and its remarkable performance was known, the Air Corps was still thinking of making the Project A type of airplane, i.e., the B-15 or an equivalent model, the backbone of its future long-range bombing force and was thinking of the smaller B-17 only as an interim type, satisfactory for training purposes pending the availability of the larger aircraft. (NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (5-9-35) (1) memorandum from the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps to G-4, October 9, 1935). Not until 1944 was this aspiration realized, when a B-15 equivalent, the B-29, came into general service in the Army Air Forces.

<sup>57</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (4-6-36), G-4 memorandum for Chief of Staff, May 3, 1938.

the funds being applied instead to the procurement of medium bombers.<sup>58</sup>

Before concluding the Project A experiment, the Air Corps had ventured still further along the same road and developed the concept of a super-bomber that dwarfed even the XB-15. Following the procedure used in Project A, the Air Corps Materiel Division early in 1935 carried out an engineering study that showed it feasible to construct a multi-engine bomber weighing about eighty tons loaded, capable of a range of 8,000 miles with a 2,400-lb bomb load or a 3,000 mile range with a 10,000 to 12,000-lb. bomb load. It would be able to transport its entire ground crew as well as the air crew on a change of base, achieve a high speed of 200 to 230 miles per hour, and have a ceiling of 25,000 ft.<sup>59</sup> The War Department in October approved negotiation of a contract with the Douglas Aircraft Company for design and engineering data for an aircraft to meet these specifications, with an option for subsequent purchase of a prototype.<sup>60</sup> The type was referred to initially as the "Project D" airplane.

In April 1936 the Secretary of War granted the Air Corps informal authority to exercise its option if satisfied with the design submitted by Douglas. When the Air Corps, late in the summer, reported that the design fulfilled all requirements and that it accordingly intended to award Douglas the formal contract, the General Staff, as we have seen,<sup>61</sup> objected strongly to continuation of the project. Not only was this "intercontinental" bomber, as it would be called today, a weapon of aggression, which a peace-loving power should not possess, but continuing research and development at this rate would, in the

<sup>58</sup>Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>59</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (11-3-33) (1) Sec. 2, memorandum of February 5, 1935, General Foulis to the Chief of Staff.

<sup>60</sup>Craven and Cate., *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>61</sup>See above, pp. 5-6.



view of G-4, "give us new airplanes before we had learned to use those now under procurement."<sup>62</sup> Following further investigation, the General Staff concluded that no requirement for the Project D aircraft existed in the national defense program, but since the Air Corps had already given the contractor verbal assurances that the option would be exercised, and the latter had incurred considerable expense on the basis of these assurances, the War Department, in order to maintain the Government's good faith, should proceed with a formal contract.<sup>63</sup>

The unwanted Project D airplane was therefore constructed, receiving the designation XB-19. Completed in 1941, it was the Air Corps' largest bomber prior to the introduction of the B-36 series after World War II. As in the case of the XB-15, flight tests revealed that it was underpowered for its size and weight, but that the design and structure were fundamentally sound. The lessons learned from it and the XB-15 paid ample dividends in the design of future long-range bomber types for the Air Corps. Among these was the well-known B-29 which, partly on the basis of experience with these two types, was designed to more modest dimensions but with considerably more powerful engines.<sup>64</sup>

## VII

While the Air Corps was concerning itself with Projects A and D and making over-ambitious plans for the organization of a future strategic bomber force around those two models, a third type of four-engine bomber, developed without official assistance, appeared on the scene.

In August 1934 the Air Corps, with the object of procuring a replacement for the standard Martin B-10, issued a circular pro-

posal to aircraft manufacturers calling for an open design competition to be held in the following year. The official specifications called for a "multi-engined" bomber with high performance characteristics.<sup>65</sup> Martin and Douglas assumed that a twin-engine design would meet the requirements and was what the Air Corps sought. The former accordingly submitted an improved version of its own B-10, the latter a military modification of its DC-3 civil transport.<sup>66</sup>

Boeing, however, believing that a twin-engine design would not be likely to give a sufficient margin of superiority over its competitors to assure success, availed itself of the latitude allowed by the specification and decided to offer a four-engine design. Drawing upon its long experience in producing civil transports, and presumably also upon preliminary work on Project A, it produced its Model 299, which was in numerous respects a scaled-down version of the latter.<sup>67</sup> Design and construction work were accomplished rapidly, considering the amount of pioneering that was necessary, and the airplane made its first flight July 28, 1935. Less than a month later it was flown non-stop from the Boeing factory at Seattle to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, averaging 232 miles per hour for the 2,100-mile trip.<sup>68</sup> This impressive flight in itself revealed that the United States had

<sup>65</sup>Requirements included: high speed of 200 to 250 miles per hour at 10,000 ft.  
operating speed of 170 to 210 miles per hour  
endurance of 6 to 10 hour  
service ceiling of 20,000 to 25,000 ft. (Collison, *op. cit.*, p. 18)

<sup>66</sup>*Aviation*, October 1935, pp. 31-32; November 1935, p. 29.

<sup>67</sup>Collison, *op. cit.*, p. 13; "The Strategic Bomber," pp. 102-103. The Boeing Company was staking not only its effort, skill, and reputation on the Model 299, but its financial solvency as well. At a particularly low ebb in its fortunes, with its liquid assets reduced to less than \$1,000,000, the firm invested two-thirds of this amount in the design and construction of the aircraft (*Time*, July 19, 1954, p. 72).

<sup>68</sup>Collison, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>62</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (5-8-35) (1), G-4 memorandum of August 8, 1936, for Chief of Staff.

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, G-4 memorandum of August 29, 1936, for Chief of Staff.

<sup>64</sup>Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

been successful in producing a bomber that combined extended range, great carrying capacity, and the speed of pursuit aircraft, and foreshadowed the phenomenally successful career that this model—the B-17, as it was to be known—was to enjoy in the course of the next ten years.

Even before the tests of the competing bombers were completed, the Air Corps was so highly impressed with the efficiency and outstanding performance of the Model 299 that it determined, if the latter won, to revise its entire procurement program for the 1936 fiscal year. In lieu of a total of 138 other aircraft of the medium bomber and observation categories on the original procurement schedule it proposed to order 65 of the new B-17 model.<sup>69</sup>

Before the War Department could give its sanction to the proposal, the tragic loss of the Model 299 during a test flight<sup>70</sup> upset these plans and, in effect, kept the Air Corps out of the heavy bomber era for several years to come. Since official evaluation of the airplane had not been completed, it was automatically eliminated from the competition, and the production contract went instead to the twin-engine Douglas B-18.<sup>71</sup>

On the basis of the tests that had been completed, however, the Air Corps was convinced of the bomber's excellent performance characteristics and felt that the loss to Army aviation of "this remarkable aeronautical development" would be a serious setback to aviation progress. Upon General Westover's recommendation, therefore, the War Department approved the negotiation of a contract with Boeing for 13 of the bombers, to be

designated Y1B-17; this quantity would be sufficient to equip one squadron and provide service experience that would be of value in considering future procurement of bombers.<sup>72</sup>

For another year the Air Corps had to content itself with its Martin B-10's. It was not until March 1937 that the first of the new B-17's was delivered to the GHQ Air Force; by August the contract was completed and all were on operational status with the Second Wing at Langley Field.<sup>73</sup>

From the very first the B-17 proved itself remarkably successful, both as a flying machine and as a military weapon. In June 1937 the Materiel Division reported to the Chief of the Air Corps in glowing terms:

The military characteristics of the Y1B-17 airplane are eminently satisfactory as evidenced by accumulated tactical and training experience to date. . . . It is the opinion of this Division that the B-17 is the most outstanding military airplane development of modern times. It has not only met every expectation from the viewpoint of tactical utility, but has exceeded performance expectations. . . .<sup>74</sup>

In short, the capabilities of the B-17 were the first tangible example of what Mitchell, Douhet, and their disciples had been theorizing about in their doctrines of air power. It was the first really satisfactory tool that the Air Corps had possessed for experimentation in the field of strategic bombing; what had for so long been taught as an abstract science could at last be translated into practical terms. It pushed back the hitherto limited horizons of the Air Corps and opened new vistas for the application of air power on the scale finally achieved in World War II.

<sup>69</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (5-9-35) (1), letter from General Foulis to The Adjutant General, October 1, 1935.

<sup>70</sup>Subsequent investigation revealed that pilot error, not mechanical fault, was to blame (Craven and Cate, *op. cit.*, p. 66).

<sup>71</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (5-9-35) (1) Acting Chief of the Air Corps to The Adjutant General, November 8, 1935.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*; in his recommendation, while in no way belittling its value, General Westover stressed again that he looked upon this type chiefly as a link between existing medium bombers and the ultimate bombardment types as represented by Projects A and D.

<sup>73</sup>Collison, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

<sup>74</sup>NA, RG 94, file AG 452.1 (6-7-37); letter from Materiel Division, Wright Field, to Chief of Air Corps, June 7, 1937.



## RE-ASSESSING A REPUTATION

By MARTIN BLUMENSON\*

A MILITARY organization, like a man, has a reputation. And like a man's, the reputation it has acquired is the result of performance. Of the units that saw action during World War II, none has a more distinguished record of accomplishment than the 90th Infantry Division, commonly acknowledged at the end of the war one of the most effective combat organizations in the European theater.

Strangely enough, during the first two months of the European campaign, no organization appeared to be so inept as the 90th. It was considered a thoroughly "eight-ball" outfit, and General Bradley very nearly dissolved the division to transform it into a replacement pool of manpower, equipment, and supplies that he could make immediately available to units performing more effectively against the enemy.<sup>1</sup> Before he did so, the division suddenly began to act in accordance with the accepted standards of combat efficiency.

What caused the change? It is generally agreed that leadership spells the difference between a mediocre organization and an outstanding unit. Certainly on the face of the situation, it seems not only reasonable but altogether clear that this was the case with the 90th Division.

No sooner had Brig. Gen. Raymond S. McLain taken command than the division began to demonstrate a combat efficiency that contrasted sharply with its earlier activity.

When General McLain, with higher rank, moved on to take command of a corps, the division achieved a high level of performance under Brig. Gen. James A. Van Fleet. When he too moved on to a corps command, the division, led in turn by Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks and Brig. Gen. Herbert L. Earnest, continued to meet the requirements of combat in highly commendable fashion.

It would seem, then, that the simple explanation of why the 90th Division changed apparently overnight from a poor to a superior combat organization is to be found in its leadership. Yet without disputing or disparaging the stimulating effect of the inspiring leadership brought to the division, it happens that the simple explanation is too glib. Other important factors need to be taken into consideration.

Investigation of the behavior of the 90th Division during its early period of combat indicates 1) that the division was not properly prepared for combat, 2) that the state of individual and unit training was the main cause of failure in Normandy, 3) that the exigencies of battle prevented the division from attaining a satisfactory level of training, and 4) that despite appearances the division made a real achievement in Normandy that has never been fully appreciated.

It is with regard to the early performance of the division that its reputation deserves re-assessment—to make more comprehensible the apparent inconsistency between early and later behavior, and to set the record straight on the significant but unappreciated achievement the division actually accomplished.

The indictment against the division is quite

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<sup>1</sup>Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York, c. 1951), p. 297.

clear and can be stated rather briefly. The entire division came ashore in France during the first week of the cross-Channel invasion and floundered badly in trying to meet the problems of hedgerow warfare. Having proved unequal to the task, the division in mid-June 1944 received the somewhat static assignment of protecting the rear of the troops striving to take the port of Cherbourg.<sup>2</sup> With Cherbourg in American hands by the beginning of July, the 90th Division attacked in the LaHaye du Puits sector and for twelve days fought an action on Mont Castre that was always in doubt as the division teetered between disaster and success. After an interval of several days, the division initiated a disgraceful performance against the "island" of St. Germain.

Innumerable examples in the official unit records make evident the inefficiency of the 90th Division during this period. The St. Germain action is perhaps the best example and certainly the most convenient illustration of exactly how bad the division was. It shows the division at its worst. The small part of the division involved was typical of the whole. And finally, the official records of the action are superb.<sup>3</sup>

The island of St. Germain, the objective of the action, is a low mound of earth surrounded by swamps. Heavy rainfall in the spring and summer of 1944 had deepened shallow ditch-like streams along its shore and had transformed the contiguous marshes into moist and treacherous bogs. Two miles long and a half mile wide, the dry ground of the

island lay athwart the division zone of advance to the south.

A hamlet near the eastern end of the island is linked to the "mainland" by a tarred road that enters the western tip. The Germans had destroyed a small bridge there, the most suitable site for engineer bridging. Several hundred yards to the east, a country lane, narrow and muddy, gives access to the island by way of a ford. The roads were the logical axes of attack and they provided a corridor through the swamps to the objective.

The principal assault problem was how to approach across open treeless marshes that offered neither cover nor concealment. Although a night attack seemed appropriate, commanders were reluctant to intensify already difficult problems of troop control. A large number of infantry replacements had arrived in the division only a few days earlier. They were poorly trained for the most part, and they were not a dependable force. Many leaders on the company and platoon levels could not recognize their own men by sight and did not know the individual combat capabilities of the troops under them.<sup>4</sup>

Abandoning the idea of a night attack, Maj. Gen. Eugene M. Landrum, the division commander, relied on strong artillery support to offset the advantage that the open marsh gave the defense. Because his effort was the single offensive action on the corps front that day, he secured more than normal support, the weight of the entire corps artillery and that of an adjacent division. In addition, elements of the 90th Division that were not attacking were to fire from their positions, and

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<sup>2</sup>*Utah Beach to Cherbourg (American Forces in Action Series, Washington, 1947)*, pp. 125-31; Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack (THE U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Washington, c. 1951)*, pp. 416-17.


<sup>3</sup>The official records include the After Action Reports, G-3 and S-3 Periodic Reports and Journals of the division and its regiments. Unless otherwise noted, documents are located in the Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office.

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<sup>4</sup>First U.S. Army Ltr, "Failure of Elements of the 358th Infantry, 90th Division, to resist a German counter-attack," 26 July, and VIII Corps Ltr, "Report of Investigation of 358th Infantry Regiment, 90th Infantry Division," 11 Aug 44 (both in the Kansas City Records Center) are the basic documents of the regimental action described below.



## THE "ISLAND" OF ST. GERMAIN



a preparatory bombardment by fighter-bombers was arranged.

The objective was proper for a regimental attack, but since the approach had to be made by way of a narrow corridor, the division commander withheld one battalion from the assault. The regimental commander, Lt. Col. Christian E. Clarke, Jr., decided to commit two battalions abreast, each on one of the roads leading to the island. With a bridgehead secured, engineers were to lay temporary bridging so that tanks and tank destroyers could cross the stream and support an infantry push to the east to secure the hamlet and clear the island.

Only an understrength battalion of German infantry defended St. Germain, but it had excellent fields of fire across the level swamps. The troops had good positions dug into hedgerows, two or three light tanks, several antitank weapons, a few assault guns, and strong artillery support. They also had the will to resist and the order to hold.<sup>5</sup>

Poor visibility during the early hours of the day of attack made it necessary to cancel the air support and ground the artillery observation planes. The massive artillery prep-

<sup>5</sup>Seventh Army and Army Group B KTBs, July 44, are the basic documents. See also AGP B Tagesmeldungen and Letztmeldungen for the period.

aration that had been arranged was in great volume but unobserved. The same factor that had made available the increased artillery support on the American side made it possible for the Germans to concentrate on the assault all their artillery and mortars within range. The German shelling was so intense that the American attack did not start at the scheduled hour. Counterbattery fire plotted by map failed to diminish the German rate of fire.

Three hours after the designated time of attack, one assault battalion began to move forward along the muddy country lane. Taking almost 50 per cent casualties in the assault companies, the battalion crossed the swamp, waded the stream, and gained the shore of the island. The momentum of the attack carried the men two hundred yards into the interior.

Since the other battalion, facing the destroyed bridge and the tar road, was unable to move beyond its line of departure, the regimental commander ordered it to shift to the country lane and reinforce the battalion on the island. Only a single rifle company managed to carry out this instruction and cross the swamp and the stream. Disappointed by the failure of the battalion commander to get more men into the bridgehead, Colonel Clarke replaced him with the regimental executive officer, Lt. Col. Frederick W. Loomis.

It seemed to Colonel Loomis that the only practical method of crossing the open approaches pounded by enemy artillery and mortars and swept by machine gun fire was by infiltration, and he tried to build up the bridgehead force in this manner. But the great majority of the troops he dispatched toward the island lost their way, either honestly or otherwise.

From the beginning of the attack, troops of both battalions had displayed a disinclination to engage the enemy. Strong and accurate German fire nourished this reluctance,

and the terrain facilitated those who wished to avoid crossing the open space of marsh and river into the bridgehead. Stragglers, individually and in groups, drifted unobtrusively out of the battle area.

At least four hundred men made the difficult passage through the swamp to establish the bridgehead. But efforts to reinforce them were unavailing. Failure to secure the bridge site prevented the engineers from installing a bridge that would allow tanks to cross. Fire from the mainland did not give the psychological support that the mere presence of tanks in the bridgehead would have rendered.

By darkness of the day of attack, the combat troops of one battalion, reduced by casualties to half strength, less their mortar platoon, plus a rifle company of the other battalion, formed a horseshoe line about two hundred yards deep and a thousand yards wide. Both flanks rested on the swamp. The troops had repelled a small enemy counter-attack. The position seemed stable.

With the descent of darkness, feelings of insecurity developed among the troops in the bridgehead. Lacking mortars, tanks, and antitank guns, the men withdrew to a defiladed road along the north edge of the island. The night was pitchblack, and furtive movement to the rear by frightened soldiers recommenced.

Shortly after nightfall, Colonel Clarke discovered that the battalion commander whose troops formed the bulk of the strength on the island had not joined his men. The regimental commander directed him to do so. The officer complied and reached the island about an hour after midnight. He had neglected, however, to take his staff with him. When Colonel Clarke learned this, he sent the battalion staff forward. The members of the staff became lost and failed to arrive.

Telephonic communication between the island and the mainland was satisfactory during the night even though breaks in the



line by enemy shelling often interrupted conversations. Normal discussions of such matters as ammunition, food, reinforcement, and antitank support gave no indication that the situation in the bridgehead was precarious.

On the near shore, Colonel Loomis was still trying to get both combat and supply personnel across the swamp to the island. Very few persons made it.

German artillery fire continued during the night. Some American wounded were evacuated from the island. Other troops, under the guise of returning for help or as message bearers, also departed the bridgehead and traveled toward the rear. One sergeant went in search of an aid station because he was suffering, he later said, from athlete's foot. The extreme darkness and the inability of small unit commanders to recognize recently arrived replacements facilitated unauthorized trips to the rear by demoralized men.

Shortly after daybreak the German shelling temporarily subsided. Three enemy tanks or assault guns appeared on one flank; an armored vehicle appeared on the other. As they commenced to fire, German infantry—about forty men—attacked.

American troops in the bridgehead became panic-stricken. Many did not fire their weapons. Groups of soldiers fell back and waded the river toward safety.

As the result of the counterattack and the individual and group withdrawals, the bridgehead force was soon reduced to less than three hundred men. They congregated in two large fields at the edge of the island. Hedgerows surrounded each of these fields on three sides. The side facing the rear was open and invited escape. The enemy provided the only restraint to wholesale retreat by automatic weapons and mortar fire.

About the time that regimental headquarters began to suspect the deteriorating situation, a shell landed in a corner of one field on the island and inflicted casualties on a

large number of men huddling together in fear. At this psychologically sensitive moment, though there was actually little firing and few Germans were in view, cries of "cease fire" swept across the two fields where the men in the bridgehead had gathered. A group of American soldiers started forward toward the enemy with their hands up. Some displayed white handkerchiefs. Others joined them or fled across the river. The force in the bridgehead disintegrated. The Germans remained in possession of St. Germain.

Casualties were high. About one hundred troops were dead, five hundred were wounded, and two hundred were captured. Three hundred more were missing immediately at the conclusion of the action.<sup>6</sup>

The causes of failure at St. Germain? Perhaps the weather. If bad weather had not grounded fighter-bombers and artillery observation planes, bombardment and more accurate shelling might have knocked out enemy communications and reduced the will to resist. Perhaps leadership on the lower levels? Had the battalion commander and his staff reached the island promptly and provided leadership and organization, the bridgehead might have held. These are possible mitigating factors that have the importance of excuses. (It may not be out of place to note here that Colonels Clarke and Loomis, for heroism in actions not long after St. Germain, were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, a decoration not given to inept combat leaders.)

The terrain and the enemy strength? The division was accustomed as well as any to fighting in the hedgerow country, and the ground presented problems no more difficult than those faced before. As for the enemy, the Germans were outnumbered at least two to one.

The reasons for defeat at St. Germain are

<sup>6</sup>90th Div AAR, July 44; First Army G-1 Daily Casualty Reports, July 44 (KCRC).

not to be found, except incidentally, in the action itself. The fundamental factors are more deeply rooted. They lead to events that had occurred before St. Germain.

General Eisenhower judged that the 90th Division had not been "properly brought up." He referred to its training in the United States and in the United Kingdom, training that left much to be desired. The division had not become a cohesive, knowledgeable, and proficient outfit, and General Eisenhower stated that it was "less well prepared for battle than almost any other" in Normandy.<sup>7</sup>

The files of the Army Ground Forces, which was responsible for training in the States, and specific comments by the Ground Forces commander, General McNair, bear out General Eisenhower's judgment. So does the initial combat experience of the division: the 90th displayed a lack of cohesion in offensive maneuver that resulted in its virtual paralysis, and the division commander was relieved immediately, in mid-June 1944.<sup>8</sup>

Almost every division entering combat for the first time committed errors due to simple inexperience. Yet most divisions settled down quickly after the baptism of fire and proceeded efficiently to the business at hand. Why not the 90th? The answer is clear: the status of training.

When General Landrum became the new commander in June 1944, he initiated an intensive training program that the troops carried out while they manned an active sector of the front. To the extent that the tactical mission permitted, individual and team tactics were exercised on all echelons. After only a very short time in which to achieve re-

sults, the division attacked Mont Castre near La Haye du Puits. In the ensuing battle that lasted twelve days, the 90th Division suffered casualties of four thousand men. Much of what had been gained in the short training period immediately before the battle was lost with the casualties that exhausted the division ranks.<sup>9</sup>

After Mont Castre the division had eight days of rest and more training, still while manning an active front. During this period of time, the division integrated thousands of individual infantry replacements to reconstitute the depleted units. By then, less than six weeks after its initial commitment in Normandy, the division had received a number of combat infantry replacements equal to 100 percent of authorized enlisted strength; officer replacements totalled more than 150 percent of authorized strength in the infantry combat elements.<sup>10</sup> Before the division could fuse the replacements into small unit fighting teams that would add up to an overall division efficiency in performance, the division embarked on the St. Germain venture. With inadequately trained replacements constituting a large portion of the force involved, with an insufficient number of experienced leaders on the lower echelons, the division stumbled badly as many soldiers misbehaved before the enemy. The result should not have been surprising.

But why was the 90th Division utilized in what would appear to be a reckless manner? The obvious answer is that the battlefield is neither a laboratory nor a schoolroom. The exigencies are pitiless, the requirements heart-breaking.

More to the point, the 90th Division had participated in more training than most units assembled in the United Kingdom before the

<sup>7</sup>Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 July 44, in files of the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), Department of the Army.

<sup>8</sup>AGF G-3 Section Files 333.1, cited R. P. Palmer, B. I. Wiley, and W. R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (THE U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Washington, 1948), p. 463, n. 32; *Utah Beach to Cherbourg*, pp. 129, 131.

<sup>9</sup>See n. 6, above.

<sup>10</sup>VIII Corps Ltr, "Report of Investigation," cited n. 4, above.



continental invasion. It was one of very few organizations that had practiced large-scale maneuvers and exercises at the Desert Training Center. Though the division had not displayed a distinguished performance according to tests applied during training, the fact that it had completed a long training cycle caused it to be selected for early employment in France.<sup>11</sup>

Why was it then chosen for the attack at Mont Castre? The division happened to be at the right place—in terms of terrain—to carry the main effort of the corps. The necessity for speed in launching the attack and the immediate non-availability of other units made the selection of the 90th inevitable.<sup>12</sup>

Again at St. Germain, the 90th faced an objective that had little intrinsic importance but was considered a prerequisite for a larger attack already scheduled. Time once more caused the 90th to be chosen for the mission.<sup>13</sup>

These exigencies, then, had prevented the division from attaining a satisfactory level of training in France. After battle had weeded out original combat defectives, the replacements were deficient. Though the division was up to strength in numbers and equipment, its state of training was sub-standard. Casualties sustained at Mont Castre dissipated the division assets, and before adequate rehabilitation was completed the disastrous attack on St. Germain took place.

It can be argued that General Landrum's training was far from effective because the excessive losses sustained at Mont Castre denoted, on the surface at least, inefficiency. There is some truth in this inference—the division made many errors; its attack seldom displayed a well co-ordinated and balanced employment of infantry, tanks, and artillery; small units did not always show aggressiveness and resolution; assault elements were too

frequently pinned down and immobilized.<sup>14</sup>

Yet it is also true that the losses of the 90th were no higher than those sustained by the 79th Division, which fought in the La Haye du Puits sector during the same period of time and which has never been accused of inefficiency. Nor was the rate of loss of the 90th greater than that suffered by the 8th Division, which fought alongside the 90th during part of the period.<sup>15</sup>

If this is inconclusive negative evidence, there is more to be said of a positive nature. Mont Castre was the left flank bastion on which the Germans had anchored their entire defensive line in Normandy. The ground was a strong natural defensive position that the Germans had improved by extensive field fortifications. The defenders of Mont Castre, experienced troops that were greatly underrated in efficiency and strength by American intelligence, were very equal in numbers to the 90th Division, and they received considerable reinforcement during the battle.<sup>16</sup> Attacking through the worst kind of hedgerow country and in plain view of the enemy who possessed commanding terrain, the 90th Division, despite its combat errors and deficiencies, overran the bastion of Mont Castre, tied down and destroyed the greater part of two enemy divisions, forced the commitment of the immediate reserves of the opposing corps, and made necessary the hurried dispatch to La Haye du Puits of army reserves.<sup>17</sup> Despite rugged opposition fought at close range, the 90th Division advanced seven miles in twelve days, a normal gain in the battle of the hedgerows but an outstanding achievement considering the opposition and the terrain.

<sup>14</sup>See the division records and the VIII Corps G-3 Journal and File for the period.

<sup>15</sup>First U.S. Army G-1 Daily Casualty Reports, July 44, KCRC.

<sup>16</sup>See First U.S. Army and VIII Corps G-2 Journals and Files, 1-5 July 44; for the German side, see documents cited n. 5 and also MS #B-731 (Fahrmacher), OCMH Files.

<sup>17</sup>Seventh Army KTB, 3-15 July 44.

<sup>11</sup>See Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *op. cit.*, pp. 470-71.

<sup>12</sup>VIII Corps AAR, July 44.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*

An eight-ball outfit? Not on the basis of the Mont Castre achievement, which was not recognized for what it was. In weakened condition due to the fierceness of the battle and before recovery of *trained* strength, a portion of the division fell on its face at St. Germain.

To recapitulate, the division was not well prepared for combat. It did not have adequate time or opportunity after entering combat to train and become ready. Yet despite these conditions, the division achieved an outstanding success at Mont Castre that St. Germain, unfortunately for the division's reputation, cancelled out.

Higher headquarters felt that the division needed new leadership, a commander not personally associated with its hedgerow fighting. General Landrum was therefore relieved, but not held responsible. "Nothing against Landrum," General Eisenhower reported, adding that he would be glad to have General Landrum command a division that Landrum had conducted through the training cycle himself.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup>Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Aug 44, OCMH Files.

While only two battalions of one regiment had demonstrated at St. Germain an impotence that applied to the whole, the remainder of the division was continuing its training. After a twelve-day program and soon after the St. Germain incident, the division played a small role in the action that brought about the breakout from Normandy. After reverting to reserve status for a few days, the division, upon recommitment early in August under a new commander, was ready to fight. Its subsequent record is proof not only of its distinguished leadership but also of its trained readiness for combat.

The point would seem to be, then, that the division was not so bad as it is usually pictured during the battle of the hedgerows. Its reputation, gained later as the result of fine leadership of an effectively trained organization, was therefore neither altogether inconsistent with its earlier achievement at Mont Castre nor entirely surprising.

The simple truth is that troops need training and that when trained, their performance must attract a favorable reputation.

#### WILLIAM HAGAN DU BARRY

William Hagan Du Barry, who came to the A.M.I. via the the Order of Indian Wars, died suddenly on 6 February 1958, while attending a dinner reception at the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia. Mr. Du Barry graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1916 with a Bachelor of Science degree. He served in WWI as a Second Lieutenant. In 1923 he joined the Staff of the University of Pennsylvania, holding successive posts; he was executive vice-president from 1944 to 1954, when he became vice president of the Corporation of the University of Pennsylvania, the position he held at the time of his death. For a short period in 1953 he was acting president, between the resignation of Harold E. Stassen and election of Dr. Gaylord P. Harnwell. Dickinson College awarded him an L.L.D. in 1944. Mr. Du Barry was active in the affairs of the Red Cross and in other community and civic affairs. He was 63 and unmarried at the time of his death.



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Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

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## REVIEWS

*The Bridge at Remagen.* By Ken Hechler. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958. Pp. 228; appendix; \$4.50; published simultaneously in paper-back edition, 50 cents).

During the Allied occupation of Germany after World War I, a private from Nebraska named John H. Timmermann marched across the Ludendorff railroad bridge over the Rhine River. Twenty-six years later Second Lieutenant Karl H. Timmermann, the private's son, crossed the same bridge.

"Git goin'! git goin'!" the private's son kept shouting. Like the men he was urging forward, he bobbed and weaved to escape rifle and machine-gun fire pouring from two towers and a tunnel at the east end of the bridge. Smoke and the acrid smell of it still hung over the bridge from an attempt made moments before by the bridge's defenders to send the bridge plunging into the Rhine. At any moment the defenders might set off other demolitions to blow Lieutenant Timmermann and his men into the river.

But Timmermann and his men got across. Up the chain of Allied command flashed the news. "Hot damn!" cried a little sergeant at a corps headquarters as he jubilantly threw down the telephone. "We've got a bridge over the Rhine and we're crossing over!" The name of the little German town where the bridge stood soon was on every lip. Remagen.

In telling the story of Remagen, Ken Hechler, a combat historian with the U. S. Army in Europe during World War II, has related more than an act of special heroism by American soldiers. He has told the story of the bridge itself and how it stood like a magnet, drawing together

dreadfully and inevitably the lives of various individuals, German and American.

Few events of World War II or any war will be researched so thoroughly as Mr. Hechler has done for Remagen. Not only did he interview Lieutenant Timmermann and most of his company of armored infantrymen soon after the event and most of the top German commanders involved. Several years after the war, he began to look up survivors of the Remagen action in the United States, to learn more of that eventful day and how the men have fared in civilian life. In 1954 he went back to Remagen where he talked at length with various Germans involved in the events at the bridge.

The author clearly has left no possible source of information untapped. Indeed, if the book has any real fault, it is that the author sometimes has given the reader too much detail.

But that will be forgiven. For the story of Remagen as Mr. Hechler tells it is intensely fascinating. It reads like a novel.

To the student of military affairs, *The Bridge at Remagen* provides an unusual look into the minds of men who are in the process of performing an act of heroism. It also gives glimpses into the work-a-day combat life of these men. It affords an interesting glance at the reaction in higher headquarters when an unexpected happening like capture of the bridge makes its inevitable impression on pre-determined strategic plans. It shows with painful clarity how innocent men can be forced in a police state to pay with their lives for something which was beyond their power to influence. Certainly it provides a valuable and revealing insight into the confusion and

demoralization within an army which is as near total defeat as was the German army in March 1945.

The casual reader and the student of military affairs alike will enjoy this book. Like the fictional bridges at San Luis Rey, Toko-Ri, and over the River Kwai, this one intrigues the reader. Perhaps more so than the others, because the story of this one is true.

CHARLES B. MACDONALD

Office of the Chief of Military History  
Department of the Army

*Lee's Dispatches. Unpublished Letters of General Robert E. Lee, C.S.A., to Jefferson Davis and the War Department of the Confederate States of America, 1862-65.* Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Douglas Southall Freeman. New Edition. With Additional Dispatches and Foreword by Grady McWhiney. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1957. Pp. 487. Index. \$5.00.)

Scattered among the bulky volumes of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies are many letters and reports from General Robert E. Lee. According to Dr. Freeman, these records are "surprisingly accurate and surpassingly complete;" but, he adds, nevertheless there were "many breaks and omissions in the published correspondence of General Lee—some of them consequential, some of them trifling."

Many of these lacunae are now happily filled by these dispatches which had not previously been available to the public. The correspondence comes from what must have been a personal file of President Davis, lost after the fall of Richmond. The dispatches are rich mines of information on Lee's character and strategy and on a number of disputed movements. Dr. Freeman finds that this correspondence "complements, fills out, and, at the same time, epitomizes the many dispatches and reports" of the Records. No higher recommendation can be given to the value of this book to the Civil War student. This book, published in a limited edition in 1915, has long been out of print. Its republication offers the opportunity of examining primary sources which concern Lee's generalship from June 3, 1862, to April 1, 1865. Here we can better understand the situations in strategy, logistics, morale, organization, and personnel during those years. We find a model of civil-military relations, with Lee's rare tact in addressing his president.

While the correspondence itself is immensely valuable, Dr. Freeman's introduction and notes in the original edition are equally interesting and important. The combination of Lee's letters and Freeman's commentary makes this an indispensable book for the Civil War enthusiast.

DONALD ARMSTRONG

*Flintlock and Tomahawk. New England in King Philip's War.* By Douglas Edward Leach. With an Introduction by Samuel Eliot Morison. (New York: MacMillan, 1958. Notes and Bibliography. Illustrated. Pp. 304. \$6.00.)

"My friend Dr. Leach," writes Samuel Eliot Morison, "has written the first comprehensive history of King Philip's War to appear since the seventeenth century." This is a high praise indeed, and it is well deserved. The last book on this war appeared more than fifty years ago, and, except for historians and students of local lore in New England, Americans today know little or nothing about this greatest and perhaps most decisive of all our early conflicts with the Indians.

King Philip's War, which turned southern New England and the Connecticut Valley into a flaming frontier in the years 1675 and 1676, was the first major test of the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay Colonies that had been established less than half a century earlier. For the Indians of the region, it was a real struggle for survival. Deprived of their land, isolated and disarmed, surrounded by their enemies, they made one last despairing effort to exterminate and drive out the white invaders. For the whites, it was a crisis of staggering proportions in which all the resources of the New England colonists were mobilized ultimately to meet this threat to their very existence. In this uneven clash of a stone age civilization against the transplanted civilization from Europe, both sides committed the worst atrocities. It was a total war with no holds barred. And when it was over, the power of the Indians of southern New England was forever broken.

The war began in June 1675, when King Philip, sachem of the Wampanogs and son of Massasoit, who had greeted the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock, defied the orders of the Plymouth Government and resorted to open warfare. Soon he was joined by other more powerful tribes, the Narragansetts and the Nipmucks, and all of New England burst into flames. How many Indians were ultimately involved is not known, but there were perhaps 20,000 in all of southern New England at the



time. How serious a threat they presented can be judged from the fact that the colonists in the region did not number more than 40,000 in 1675.

The reaction of the colonists was prompt. Organized into the New England Confederation, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Plymouth concerted measures for their defense and raised forces to meet the danger. But all did not go smoothly with the Confederation. Command went to the Massachusetts men, who comprised the bulk of the forces, but Connecticut thought her troops ought to defend their own towns rather than those in Western Massachusetts. Rhode Island acted independently, and New York, which had a score of her own to settle with New England, was suspected of supporting the Indians with guns and powder.

Aided by these dissensions and differences, and the failure of the colonists to develop an adequate tactical and supply system, the Indians scored a number of important victories at the outset. Up and down the Connecticut Valley, then the extreme limits of settlement, they ravaged town after town until the entire region was almost a charred wasteland. Northfield, Deerfield, Brookfield, Worcester, Groton, and even Springfield felt the fury of Indian attack. Throughout the fall and winter of 1675, the Indians retained the initiative, appearing unexpectedly first at one place then another to kill and burn and then disappear again into the forest.

Gradually the colonists developed measures to meet the Indian hit and run tactics and resolved their differences. They burned the Indians' crops whenever they found them, destroyed their supplies, kept them always on the move. Aided by their Indian allies the Mohegans, the colonists sought out the enemy's hiding places, striking them as suddenly and savagely as any red man.

Deprived of their food and the opportunity to grow more, the Indians suffered as much as the whites. Behind them and around them were more English settlements and their deadly enemies, the fierce Iroquois. With no place to which to retreat, starved, and with the bitter New England winter approaching, they finally gave in. King Philip's death in August 1676 brought the war to an end. Resolved never to permit a repetition of these events, the Colonial authorities executed the Indian leaders, sold many into slavery in the West Indies, and placed the survivors under the most stringent controls.

By modern standards, King Philip's War was a

small affair, but it was the largest conflict in 17th Century America, surpassed in severity only by the Virginia Massacres of 1622. Casualties numbered only a few thousand, but in proportion to population they were greater than any other war in our history. Whole communities were destroyed, the economy of the country disrupted, and the line of settlement pushed south and east. The war debt reached what was for that time the staggering total of £100,000, and the devastation in homes burned, cattle destroyed, and property lost was almost incalculable. It would be many years before New England recovered from this blow.

Douglas Leach has done more than resurrect an almost forgotten war. He has placed that war in its setting and given us a political and social history of New England in 1675 that illuminates each move by the colonists and the Indians. And he has done this with a keen eye for the significant and the dramatic. He has treated each side with sympathy and understanding, but with honesty. He shows how the cruelty of the Indian was matched at every turn by the colonists. This was a life and death struggle, and if the Indian fought the only way he knew, the Puritans, firm in the rightness of their cause, proved they could meet the Indians on their own terms and defeat them.

LOUIS MORTON

*Office, Chief of Military History  
Department of the Army*

*Air Dates.* By Air Commodore L. G. Payne.  
(New York: Praeger, 1957. Pp. 565. \$7.50.)

The idea of a handy compendium of important aeronautical dates is a good one, but the execution of this one leaves much to be desired. Although this book can serve a useful reference purpose, it is a pity that the author did not take greater care in defining his objectives and establishing the criteria for selection of events.

As always in a work of this sort, it is possible to quarrel with both the selection and omission of items. While the omissions are often striking, so many irrelevant items are included that one must conclude that the author is frequently only filling up space, or rather filling in dates. On p. 505, under date of December 10, 1955, we are told that "An Israeli police launch on Lake Tiberias was damaged by Syrian artillery fire." Hundreds of other events mentioned are equally irrelevant to aeronautics and inconsequential.

On the other hand there is nothing on U. S. naval aviation before World War II or on aero-

navies in the Soviet Union prior to 1937. The great air battles of the Coral Sea and Midway are not mentioned, and the whole Pacific War is slighted. In large part, these omissions are probably the result of the great emphasis on British air events, an emphasis which went so far as to list almost every occasion when bombs were dropped on the United Kingdom in World War II. Thus we find that on June 28-29, 1942, "Weston-super-Mare was bombed" and on July 6-7, 1942, "Middlesborough was bombed." The compiler may be pardoned his preoccupation with his homeland, but it has produced a work which is severely limited in its value outside of Great Britain.

Had careful criteria been applied to selection of events, it is likely that the book would have been half as long and twice as useful. Incidentally, its usefulness is greatly enhanced by a lengthy and thorough index.

ALFRED GOLDBERG  
Washington, D. C.

*How The Soviet System Works, Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes*, by Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, pp. 274, including bibliography and index, \$4.75); *The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia, An Economic-Historical Analysis*, by Nicholas L. Fr.-Chirovsky (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 178, including bibliography and index, \$3.75); *Russia in Transition and Other Essays*, by Isaac Deutscher (New York: Coward-McCann, 1957, pp. 245, \$4.50); *Communism and the Russian Peasant and Moscow in Crisis*, by Herbert S. Dinerstein and Leon Gouré (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955, pp. 254, including bibliography, \$4.50); *Russian Liberalism*, by George Fischer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, pp. 240, including bibliography, index and illustrations, \$4.50); *Communism on the Decline*, by George C. Guins (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, pp. 287, including bibliography and index, \$7.50); *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, by John H. Kautsky (New York: Wiley, 1956, pp. 220, including bibliography and index, \$6.00); *Soviet Education for Science and Technology*, by Alexander G. Korol (New York: Wiley, 1957, pp. 513, including bibliography and index, \$8.50); *The Hungarian Revolution*, by Melvin J. Lasky (edi-

tor), with contributions by Hugh Seton-Watson and François Bondy (New York: Praeger, 1957, pp. 318, \$5.00); *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland* by Victor Leontovitsch (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1957, pp. 426, including index); *Russia Against the Kremlin*, by Alexander Metaxas (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1957, pp. 189, including index, \$3.00); *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*, by W. W. Rostow (New York: The New American Library, 1954, pp. 264, including bibliography and index, 50c); *Communist China Today*, by Peter S. H. Tang (New York: Praeger, 1957-1958, 2 vols., pp. 536 and pp. 137, including bibliography and index, \$10.00, \$3.50); *The Russian Intelligentsia, Makers of the Revolutionary State*, by Stuart Ramsay Tompkins (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957, pp. 282, including bibliography and index, \$5.00).

During the last few years, there has been a considerable output of books dealing with the Soviet Union and related subjects. It is a sign of the times that while until recently Russia usually was depicted as the homeland of tyranny and terrorism, more emphasis is now being placed upon Russia's liberal and democratic traditions and prospects. In this more balanced treatment, Russian history remains a chronicle of grim and murderous facts, and of many failures of freedom. But we are learning more about the many attempts by high-minded Russian idealists who, although they always failed, nevertheless were inspired by the ideals of progress and liberty which they liked to implant in the politically barren soil of the Russian empire.

The liberal tradition within Russia is discussed in three scholarly volumes by Fischer, Tompkins and Leontovitsch, unfortunately without too much attention to the crucial national question. The authors show that in the periods covered by them essentially from the liberation of the serfs to the agrarian reform under Stolypin—the intelligentsia and liberal parties, or rather proto-parties, had a considerable impact on social and political developments in Russia. These books did not unearth any great liberal thinkers because there were none, but they show that there was a significant political debate during the reign of the three last tsars in which the Russian liberals made telling points both against the ideologists of absolutism and those of the socialist revolution. It is very true



that the Russian liberals were ineffective and dogmatic politicians who did not know how to gain or use power, who were unable to convince their opponents and to gain many adherents among the Russian people. It is also true that numerous liberals became socialists, or at least shared many of the socialist thoughts, just as it is a fact that some disappointed socialists turned to a liberal orientation. All this remains a story of confusion and incompetence. But those who would understand the past and present of Russia must free themselves of the prejudice that socialism held a tight intellectual monopoly over the Russian intelligentsia. It may be added that Thomas G. Masaryk's standard work on the *Spirit of Russia* is still the unsurpassed masterwork on the subject. The English publisher Allen & Unwin should be congratulated for having re-issued this unforgettable and indispensable book in 1955.

Whether or not Russian democratic traditions have been weak, some writers believe that henceforth things are bound to change. In *Communism on the Decline*, George C. Guins asserts that communism is approaching its final stage. His book is a rich collection of facts dealing with the Soviet economy as well as the psychology of Russia. It too ignores the nationality question within the Soviet empire and the communist bloc. Despite his optimism for which he makes a good though not entirely convincing case, Guins advises "a vigilant attitude toward Soviet smiles . . . until deeds prove Soviet readiness to cooperate honestly with the free world." Since even "the death throes of communism may be very prolonged," he proposes that the West take "the initiative" and "start an ideological and diplomatic offensive rather than . . . continue the sterile policy of containment or defeatist 'neutralism.'" He implies that communism which now is becoming ever more vulnerable may be eliminated through attack.

In contrast to this advice, Metaxas in his *Russia against the Kremlin* suggests an expectant attitude toward the rising Russian generation. A Russian-speaking French journalist, he has traveled far and wide throughout the Soviet Union and without benefit of police supervision, has talked to many Russians. Metaxas is very informative about recent economic and ideological developments. Since he thinks highly of the young generation, he anticipates an evolutionary democratization of Russia and forecasts a peaceful dissolution of the communist regime. He adduces good arguments for his hope, but many of the

incidents which he is reporting would lend themselves to a more pessimistic interpretation. The entire history of Russia, as well as the history of dictatorship, cast considerable doubt on the thesis of peaceful disintegration.

Even granting constructive desires by the younger generation, the fantastic disorientation of Russian minds is bound to hamper democratic evolution. For example, according to Metaxas, democratically inclined Russians sharply criticized the Soviet intervention in Hungary, but they also believed that the Hungarian revolutionaries tried "to pass in a few days from Communism to extreme rightism." The young Russians just don't want to have anything to do with "rightist" movements. After forty years of communism, the Russian youth still seems to be strongly socialistic and it hardly occurs to them to question the validity and completeness of the evidence on which they are basing their judgments.

As to the question of whether the Hungarian revolution was "rightist" or perhaps truly progressive, we find a dramatic answer in *The Hungarian Revolution* issued by the well-known editor Melvin J. Lasky, together with the Frenchman François Bondy and the excellent British historian Hugh Seton-Watson. This book is an objective and gripping record of the freedom battles in Budapest and contains documents, interpretations and some of the most dramatic pictures of those historic days. It is perfectly plain that this was no "rightist" revolution, but an uprising by Hungarian workers against Soviet domination. Clearly, the Hungarian people was tired of waiting for the democratization of Russia and was willing to risk its life to regain freedom from a not-yet-free people whose lack of democratic conviction prevented peaceful co-existence even within the Soviet bloc. Lasky's record shows where the optimistic interpreters of the Soviet scene may prove to be poor prophets. The Russian people has had the patience to live with bad government throughout its history, but the world and particularly the oppressed nations, may not have the patience to wait many more decades before the Russians with their slow political thinking, will make up their minds whether or not they want democracy and how they can get it.

Many of Metaxas' ideas can be found in Deutscher's *Russia in Transition*. Deutscher is a very knowledgeable writer who has many interesting things to say. Unfortunately, he too is a disciple of the optimistic school and tends to put a pleasing interpretation on communist actions and

developments. He belongs to the clique of writers who have the reputation that they know about Kremlin secrets, though their speculations are built on little more than careful perusal of the Russian press, occasional talks with travellers, a good memory for names, and a fertile imagination. Deutscher is relatively good at this game of "Kremlinology" but his judgment often is faulty. Thus, he predicted the eventual establishment of a military dictatorship. For a time this "hope" was the favorite thesis of the optimists; why *hope* should have been pinned on a Russian general to save the U. S. from calamity, is a little hard to understand. At any rate, after Zhukov's downfall, this talk evaporated and the optimists have more or less refrained from enlarging on the obvious fact, namely that the bolshevik party still is the undisputed master of the Soviet Union. Hence, "hope" has become more abstract and remote.

But why should Western readers rely on the *impressions* by newspapermen who may or may not be reporting objectively what they see or what they wish to see? For several years, the Harvard Project on the Soviet social system, supported by the U. S. Air Force, scientifically investigated *How the Soviet System Works*. For the first time batteries of psychological tests were used to analyze more or less significant "samples" of Russians and to explore the mysterious psychology of the enigmatic Russian people. (There were no samples of Ukrainians and other non-Russians from the Soviet empire.) While the project encountered many technical and methodological difficulties, they have used every scientific precaution to protect themselves against misinterpretation. So far, the validity of their findings seems to be borne out by the accuracy of their forecasts. For example, they did *not* believe that the military would take over, but stated explicitly "that power will remain 'predominantly' in the political arm," i.e., the party. "Our best prediction for the short run is that at 'worst' the present regime may revert to Stalinism and at 'best' it may become a more popular, or at least less resented, but no less totalitarian government."

The message of this scientific investigation is that "it takes more to destroy a system . . . than its own internal contradictions." The system, though it will undergo some change, will neither break down nor be substantially modified within less than 15 years, if then, these investigators think. The authors state that a very slight relaxation of terror and slight improvements in the

standards of living, including "modest improvements in the flow of food and hard goods, if these are steady and appear to be harbingers of more to come," will allow the regime to "acquire larger increments of good will and secure substantially improved morale." This extensive study gives no evidence that the Russians are interested in democracy, or that they have strong desires for freedom. They may desire a little more freedom than they now enjoy, but the meaning of this study really is that the Russians can be bribed easily and cheaply to support the Soviet regime. About four-fifths of the population want to preserve some of the major aspects of the Soviet system. Dinerstein and Gouré in their interesting study of *Moscow in Crisis* which details the events in the Soviet capital during the German attack of 1941, support the Harvard findings with the following conclusion: "Discouraging as it may be, the fact remains that at the height of the crisis the majority of the population of Moscow did not rebel against their rulers. And, on the basis of available evidence, they had no intention of doing so."

A study of *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* by W. W. Rostow and associates which, with resources supplied by MIT, also made careful use of scientific methods, is a trifle more optimistic as it sees many social forces pressing against the Soviet system. But they, too, warn against an "easy optimism concerning the timing of a change in the Soviet system or concerning the process of transition." The new and old forces clash, but the newer forces "will not easily triumph" over the older ones. "Nor will such change necessarily and automatically work in the interests of the United States and common humanity everywhere."—It is hard to see what it all means, especially since the Russian people is extremely moody. Although some better hope may be justified, the best evidence available still militates against optimistic expectations.

Now to the purely informative books. *The Economic Factors in the Growth of Russia*, among other things, discusses the influence of economic factors on Russian psychology. Czyrowski who goes back to the eleventh century, is much impressed by the continuity of Russian political behavior throughout known history. Alexander Korol's *Soviet Education for Science and Technology* which has found wide acclaim has become the standard work on the subject. Soviet education must be studied by anyone who would analyze the economic, technical, military, and intellectual



and scientific strengths of the communist empire. Beyond being instructive with respect to communist practices, this is one of the very few works on the Soviet Union which may be studied for the purpose of getting information which may be useful for the United States. The Soviet educational system has posed a genuine challenge which must be met. Korol's factual and reasoned elucidation deserves our greatest attention. Regardless of which educational system is "better," we don't know all the answers and should learn from the Soviet experience.

*Moscow and the Communist Party of India* deals with the workings of the communist international machine. Kautsky has produced a somewhat pedestrian but useful study of the Indian communist party and its dependence upon Moscow, as well as its role within communist world strategy. The book provides interesting insight into some Indian problems.

Peter Tang's *Communist China Today* is the most thorough and best documented study of the subject presently in print. Supplemented by a second volume of documents and useful chronology of events, the author has dealt systematically with all important phases of the Chinese system from its ideological and historical background through its leadership and the party and state machines, to economics, propaganda, and the armed forces. Russian-Chinese relations and the relations of China with the East European satellites, South East Asia, and the United States are analyzed with great care. Dr. Tang believes "that communism in China is not a unique brand which differs in substance from the communism of the Soviet Union. Rather it represents an application to the Chinese mainland, of the principles of international communism, under leaders who are wholeheartedly devoted to the advancement of the movement and who closely cooperate with the leaders of the Soviet Union. To understand communist China, it is necessary to penetrate to the very roots of international communism and to study its manifestations and operations on the Chinese mainland." Dr. Tang believes that the Soviet Union and Soviet China "will remain solidly united in advancing the cause of world communism. . . . It would be supremely unwise to hope for any collapse of the axis as a result of inner tensions. Instead the integration of the power of the two leading communist allies . . . is progressing rapidly. The unity of purpose and action of this growing partnership is already making itself felt beyond the borders of communist China and the U.S.S.R.,

with extremely grave implications for the prospects of peace in the world." So much for "optimism" as seen from the East.

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*Secret Servants*, by Ronald Seth (New York: Farrar Straus, 1957, pp. 278, bibliography, \$4.00); *The Art of Spying*, by Ronald Seth (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 182, index, 5 illustrations, \$6.00).

Although published at different times by different publishers these two Seth offerings so complement each other they should be read together. Ronald Seth, master intelligence historian and himself an experienced and competent agent, has made two valuable contributions to the ever-growing field of authentic, documented "spy" literature.

*Secret Servants* traces the rise, development, philosophy, and operating methods of the Japanese espionage service up to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Making liberal use of actual cases, Mr. Seth presents a graphic study of great value to all military men and others interested in espionage. Much of his information will be of value to Far Eastern historians and specialists in their interpretations of Japanese activities between World Wars I and II.

*The Art of Spying* is a well-written, fascinating study of the individual spy. In some ways it may be considered to be an extension of *Secret Servants* since it enlarges on the careers of a number of individuals mentioned only briefly in the latter book. The background and life story of five outstanding international agents unfolds for the reader in a fashion which places this book in the foremost ranks of the authentic "thriller" class.

These two works should be carefully studied by everyone in the intelligence field. As exposes of techniques and operational methods they are excellent. In addition, Seth has captured a rare quality—the writing a most readable and enjoyable technical book.

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*Tomorrow to Live*, by William Herber (New York: Coward, McCann, 1958. Pp. 317, \$3.95).

This is a war novel, and as such combines personal conflict, personality clashes, a liberal sprinkling of sex, and some Pacific combat. It has a standard, Hollywood-type cast—the eager lieuten-

ant, the strong-willed platoon sergeant, the Jewish officer who is the target of intolerance, the Polack corporal, the educated Indian who speaks a jargon about palefaces and reservations. Despite the handicaps of a near-standard plot and stereotyped characters, the author's writing ability makes it an entertaining book, and it will enjoy a good drug-store sale.

As a historical account of the battle for Saipan, it contributes nothing to the over-all picture. It

is a small-unit account, and no attempt is made to identify the combat as part of a larger battle except that it happened on Saipan, and even then some of the action seems highly fictional or exaggerated. Historians or military readers will be bothered by the novel's theme—the continual battle for dominance between officer and platoon sergeant, which causes them to almost forget there is another enemy on the island.

D. T. KANE

## SHORT REVIEWS

**STRATEGY AND COMPROMISE.** By *Samuel Eliot Morison*. (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company. 1958. Pp. 120. \$3.00.)

In his usual felicitous style Admiral Morison outlines the reasons for and the results of the great strategical decisions made by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Committee of the British Chiefs of Staff. At various points he takes issue with Sir Arthur Bryant's assessment of the contributions of Lord Alanbrooke to the world strategy of the Anglo-American powers. With broad brush strokes he describes how General Marshall, Admiral King, Sir John Dill, President Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill interacted in their efforts to produce the winning strategy.

**THE COAST GUARD ACADEMY; THE LIFE OF A CADET.** By *Jack Engleman*. (New York: Lothrop Lee and Shephard Company. 1957. Pp. 128. \$3.50.)

Most readers of this pictorial history will agree with Vice Admiral A. C. Richmond, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, who declares in the Foreword that the author "has captured perfectly the story of the Coast Guard Academy."

**JAPAN DICTIONARY, JAPANALIA.** By *Lewis Bush*. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1957. Pp. 226. \$10.00.)

Printed in Japan, this is a compendium of information rather than an ordinary dictionary. It is based on 20 years of work by the English author who now works for Radio Japan.

**THE FIRST BOOK OF SUBMARINES.** By *Capt. J. B. Icenhower*, USN. Illustrated by *Mildred Waltrip*. (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc. 1957. Pp. 60. \$1.95.)

In this small volume Icenhower provides an excellent illustrated introduction to submarines for young readers.

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE PAPERS.** *Military Industrial Conference, 1957.* (Chicago: The Conference Committee, 1957. Pp. 158. Apply.)

The third such conference sponsored by the Society of American Military Engineers in which national leaders in many fields discussed current problems of national security in military, economic, ideological, educational, scientific and strategic aspects.

**RECRUITING VOLUNTEER ENLISTED MEN.** By *Col. Clark L. Hosmer*. (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1956. Pp. 75. Apply.)

A study which examines through the use of questionnaires the social prestige of enlisted men in the world of civilian and military positions and the relative standing of the Armed Forces with respect to each other.

**KIBOKO.** By *Daniel P. Mannix*. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1958. Pp. 448. \$4.95.)

Central Africa in the period 1870-1900 is the scene of this novel partly based upon history. It includes a large-scale lake and land battle with native forces led by an American former slaver against British forces. A readable action-packed story which provides sidelights for today.

**TROUBLE AT TULLY'S RUN.** By *George C. Appell*. (New York: Macmillan, 1958. Pp. 46. \$2.95.)



A good military western laid in post-Civil War Arizona with "trouble" with a Mexican raider the focus of the story.

**THE WHITE WITCH.** By *Elizabeth Gouge*. New York: Coward-McCann, 1958. Pp. 439. \$4.95.)

The England of Charles I is the backdrop for the rich descriptions of the author. The military historian will find only brief illuminating scenes in this novel up to the author's usual high standard.

**A UN PEACE FORCE?** By *William Frye*. (New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1957. Pp. 28. \$.25. Pamphlet No. 257.)

A summary of the author's book.

**THE LONG HAUL WEST, THE GREAT CANAL ERA 1817-1850.** By *Madeline S. Waggoner*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958. Pp. 320. \$5.75.)

A popularly written history with Bibliography of Primary and Secondary sources and Index. Includes accounts of engineering problems and canal boat life as America expanded West during this period.

**HANDBOOK.** (Williamsburg: The Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1957. Pp. 33. Apply.)

A brief description of the Institute's activities and publications, including their readable books about early American history.

**THE REICHSWEHR AND THE GERMAN REPUBLIC, 1919-1926.** By *Harold J. Gordon, Jr.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Pp. 478. \$7.50.)

An important description of the role the Reichswehr played in the reestablishment of order in Germany, an examination of the policies of its leaders and the relation of the army to the Republic based upon extensive research into published and manuscript sources, questionnaires and interviews.

**THE PENTAGON CASE.** By *Col. Victor J. Fox*. (New York: Freedom Press. 1958. Pp. 247. \$3.25.)

Col. Victor J. Fox is the pen-name of the writer of what may be the most important piece

of "fiction" published this year. Calling on his vast experience, Fox strips bare the machinery of the Pentagon which has wilfully let itself be drawn into serving the cause of Communist propaganda. Told in plain, unembellished journalese, *The Pentagon Case* tells the story of what happens when an ex-Marine tries to expose an enemy underground cell operating within the Pentagon. Fiction it may be, but the ring of truth is so clear it will terrify the intelligent reader—particularly if he has ever served in the Pentagon. No book ever written before so typifies the frustration of the loyal staff officer trying to do his duty in spite of the self-serving bureaucrat as does this one.

*The Pentagon Case* could rank with Zola's *J'accuse*; it could create a fictitious "Dreyfuss Case;" it could start a searching and important Congressional investigation; it could do lots of things. But it probably won't. This is one book both sides will try to suppress.

Consider yourself fortunate if you can obtain a copy for your library. The interested reader who misses this one will have missed much.

**THE TRAGEDY OF BOLIVIA.** By *Alberto O. Gutierrez*. (New York: The Devin-Adair Company. 1958. Pp. 224. \$4.00.)

While *The Tragedy Of Bolivia* is basically a study in government, its emphasis on the relations between the civil and military sides of government make it of great interest to every military-minded reader. Writing from his experience as Minister of Foreign Affairs and a former Ambassador, Ostria traces the events leading up to the military inspired revolution of 1943, and the seizure of power by Major Villariael.

As a study in Communist methodology and manipulations, this book is most timely. It makes alarming reading since it exposes areas of operations in which we in the United States appear to have developed a blind spot. To see how close Moscow came to capturing this strategic area, read *The Tragedy of Bolivia*.

**PANZER LEADER.** By *Heinz Guderian*. [tr. by Constantine Fitzgibbon.] (New York: Ballantine Books. 1958. Pp. 400. 50 cents.)

A slightly abridged version of what has become a classic account of World War II from the German side. Of particular interest in detailing the development of armor doctrine. Well worth the purchase price.

END OF A WAR. By *Edward Loomis*. (New York: Ballantine Books. 1958. Pp. 245. \$3.95.)

A rather confused novel depicting the effect of combat (World War II: Europe) on the individual soldier; the attempt to show how men became brutal and how they returned to normality at the end of the conflict. The writing is excellent.

PATROL. By *Fred Majdalany*. (New York: Ballantine Books. 1958. Pp. 149. 35 cents.)

Without doubt one of the best novels of World War II, a book distinguished for its honesty, simplicity, and vividness. The scene of action is North Africa, 1943, but the writing transcends the locale.

ARMY SOCIAL CUSTOMS. By *Esther Wier*. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company. 1958. Pp. 146. Index. \$3.00.)

Addressed in particular to the Army wife but of value also to the Army man, the volume details the social rules and regulations of Army life. Calls, cards, invitations, dress, service courtesies are some of the subjects discussed. The writing is good and direct; reading is easy.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. By *Washington Platt*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. 302. \$4.00.)

An analysis of the job of the intelligence officer. The author is a brigadier general in the Army Reserve who has had extensive experience in both industrial research and military intelligence work. The book deals with the basic steps of the intelligence process, production, and forecasting. The author discusses personnel requirements for graduate training, and the importance of the social and political sciences.

WORLD POLITY. *Institute of World Polity*. (Utrecht, Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers. 1957. Pp. 247.)

This is the first yearbook of *The Institute of World Polity* which has its headquarters at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. The volume deals with the history and functions of the Institute, and consists of essays on such topics as "military necessity" in international law, and post-war reparations from Carthage to Versailles.

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Since the appearance of the Spring number of *Military Affairs*, XXII, 1, the following names have been added to the honor roll of the President's "Every Member Get a Member Campaign."

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It is hoped that members will continue their activity in recruiting new members at opportune times. Fortunately our attritional loss of old members is small but, in the nature of things, no organization is ever free of the necessity of recruitment.

## JOINT SESSION OF AMI-AHA

President T. N. Dupuy reports that the next annual joint session of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association will be held 28-30 December 1958, at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C. The chosen topic is "New Perspectives on World War II." Papers will be presented by Dr. Norman Gibbs on "Strategy in the War Against Germany," and by Dr. Louis Morton on "Strategy in the War Against Japan." The critique will be delivered by Colonel George A. Lincoln, formerly of the Strategic Planning Staffs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and, presently, Head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy.

## BACK ISSUES DESIRED

We are out of stock of several back issues

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## PAUL J. SCHEIPS

There comes a time in every true historians life when he simply must get that book in print: that time has come for Paul J. Scheips, our esteemed associate on the Editorial Staff of *Military Affairs*. We regret to announce his resignation from the Staff on which Paul has served so industriously for half a decade, from the Fall issue of 1953 through the Spring number of 1958. He was always one of the most willing workers in performing any of the hard, time-consuming tasks required to produce a publication. Characterized by unswerving idealism for the technical aspects of historical writing, his views and example were much appreciated by the entire Staff. We learned to know him as a professionally trained historical scholar of integrity and competence. In view of the coming centennial of the Signal Corps, for the next year or two Paul intends to concentrate all his efforts on the production of a biography of Brigadier General Albert J. Myer, founder of the Corps and the first Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army.

## K. JACK BAUER

We are pleased to announce that Dr. K. Jack Bauer has consented to assume the post of associate vacated by Paul Scheips.

Jack has faithfully served the the AMI for the past two years, 1955-1957, in the onerous job of assistant treasurer in charge of subscriptions, and more latterly on the Editorial Staff. His study, "The Veracruz Expedition of 1847," appeared in *Military Affairs*, XX, 3 (Fall 1956). Since receiving his doctorate Jack has seen service with the National Archives, the Historical Branch at United States Marine Corps Headquarters, and is currently a historian in the office of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison.

#### EUGENE M. EMME

Dr. Eugene M. Emme has accepted a position with the national headquarters of Civil Defense in Battle Creek, Michigan. He will be a division chief in the new Operations Research Office of the Federal Civil Defense Administration headquarters.

Since 1949, Dr. Emme has been associated with the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. After several years as a research historian with the Research Studies Institute, he became Director of the Graduate Study Group of the Air War College. Dr. Emme is a trustee of the American Military Institute.

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### NECROLOGY

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#### WILLIAM H. FRANCIS, JR.

William H. Francis, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces, died unexpectedly on 24 May 1958. He was born in Fort Worth, Texas, November 11, 1914. After graduating from The Rice Institute in 1935, Mr. Francis entered the University of Texas Law School, where he received his Bachelor of Laws degrees in 1938, with highest honors and entered on the practice of law immediately following his graduation. Commencing his Army service in WWII, as an enlisted

man, he was appointed by President Eisenhower in March 1957 as an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Mr. Francis joined the A.M.I. in December 1957.

#### FRANK O. HOUGH

As our previous issue was going to press we could report only briefly that news had just been received of the death at the age of 58 of our late editorial associate, Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough, USMCR, at San Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato, Mexico, Friday 16 May 1958. Colonel Hough was a native of Rochester, N. Y., and, while still under age, enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1918. When discharged in 1919 he had served in France and became one of the youngest sergeants in the Corps. After World War I, he graduated from Brown University, then entered newspaper work and later became a novelist. Frank wrote three historical novels: *Renown*, a book about Benedict Arnold; and two others, *If Not Victory*, and *The Neutral Ground*. He was also the author of *The Island War*, a best seller history of the Marine fighting in the Pacific in World War II, and of a number of historical monographs published by the Marine Corps.

Frank Hough reentered the Marines as a captain in September 1942, and saw service in the battles for Cape Gloucester and Peleliu. After the war he served for twelve years in the historical section at Marine Corps Headquarters, and retired on physical disability in October 1958. Colonel Hough went to Mexico in February of the current year to live with his sister-in-law, Mrs. David M. Hough. He served the AMI on the Editorial Staff of *Military Affairs* 1951-1956, and also on the Board of Trustees. The editor and members of the *Military Affairs* staff paid their last respects to the ashes of their much-liked and respected associate at his military funeral in Arlington National Cemetery, 27 June 1958.



### MONCADO AWARD COMMITTEE

This Committee is in process of reorganization, by direction of the Board of Trustees at their meeting of 2 May 1958. The new program will be announced in the fall 1958 issue.

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Type manuscripts on one side of 8½ x 11 inch bond paper. Leave ample margins and double-space throughout, *including* footnotes and quotations to be set in reduced type. Footnotes should be double-spaced on sheets separate from the text and placed after the last page of the article. In matters of style and footnote citations the latest edition of Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers* . . . (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) is to be followed. For points not covered adequately therein the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) should be consulted.

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